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INTRODUCTION
In 2007, James Skelcy was diagnosed with dermatomyositis, a
connective tissue disease, and interstitial lung disease.1 After receiving
several ineffective medications, Mr. Skelcy’s rheumatologist prescribed
him two doses of rituximab (i.e., a drug used to treat autoimmune diseases
and certain types of cancer), allowing him to enter and maintain remission
for almost a full year.2 In 2010, when his symptoms returned, his insurer
refused to cover the medication, ignoring his rheumatologist’s urgent

1. Skelcy v. UnitedHealth Grp., Inc., 620 F. App’x 136, 138 (3d Cir. 2015).
2. Id.
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request for the medication.3 After a thirty-two-day delay in treatment due
to back-and forth-communications with the insurer, Mr. Skelcy died of
chronic dermatomyositis, interstitial pulmonary fibrosis, endomyocardial
fibrosis, and cardiac arrhythmia—conditions the prescribed medication
likely could have prevented if authorized in time.4
In 2011, Shima Andre was diagnosed with hepatitis C, a chronic liver
disease.5 Her physician prescribed her a medication that cost $99,000
without insurance coverage but cured the deadly virus in most individuals
with hepatitis C.6 Ms. Andre’s insurer refused to cover the medication,
deeming it “not medically necessary.” 7 The insurer explained that it
would only cover the medication for individuals who had evidence of
“advanced liver damage,” meaning Ms. Andre’s disease would have to
progress to the point in which she needed a liver transplant before she
could access the cure.8
Mr. Skelcy’s and Ms. Andre’s stories are not uncommon. In fact, a
2011 study revealed that the United States ranked last among sixteen
developed nations for preventing deaths from treatable conditions—
including certain forms of cancer, diabetes, and stroke—through timely
access to effective health care.9
With the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) in 2010, millions of Americans gained access to health care.10
Yet, many individuals with conditions that have been historically more
expensive to treat, such as cancer, HIV, and hepatitis C, still find
themselves subject to overly restrictive benefit utilization management
practices that forbid access to medically necessary, life-sustaining
treatments.11 Moreover, with the new administration calling for the
3. Id. “Insurer,” as used in this Article, refers to private health insurers, health plans, fiduciaries,
and administrators.
4. Id. at 139.
5. Stuart Pfeifer, Woman Sues Anthem Blue Cross for Refusing to Cover Hepatitis C Drug, L.A.
TIMES (May 18, 2015, 10:14 PM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-anthem-blue-crossharvoni-lawsuit-20150518-story.html.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. COMMONWEALTH FUND COMM’N ON A HIGH PERFORMANCE HEALTH SYS., WHY NOT THE
BEST?: RESULTS FROM THE NATIONAL SCORECARD ON U.S. HEALTH SYSTEM PERFORMANCE 9
(Oct.
2011),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/~/media/files/publications/fundreport/2011/oct/1500_wntb_natl_scorecard_2011_web_v2.pdf.
10. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (2015).
11. The term “benefit utilization management” as used in this Article, refers to insurers’ costsaving techniques that are intended to influence practitioners’ and patients’ health care decision
making.
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repeal of the ACA, insurers may find it easier to discriminate against
individuals based on their health conditions.
Insurers’ overly burdensome benefit utilization management practices
are unethical, inefficient, and, in some instances, illegal. They result in
poor quality of care and take health care decisions away from
practitioners and patients. Therefore, consumers must be empowered to
bring suits, and federal and state authorities must enforce laws currently
in place to ensure that individuals with chronic, debilitating, and rare
health conditions have timely access to coverage of quality care. Where
such protections are lacking, states must enact stronger laws.12 This
Article examines several benefit utilization management practices,
including step therapy, adverse tiering, nonmedical switching, prior
authorization, narrow networks, and clinical pathways. It analyzes
relevant statutory and case law, including consumer protection laws, tort
law, and contract law and calls for greater enforcement. This Article also
provides consumers with the information necessary to bring a lawsuit or
file a complaint, recommends state legislation addressing burdensome
insurance practices, and encourages states to provide regulators with the
proper authority to take enforcement actions.
I. COMMON BENEFIT UTILIZATION MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Providing quality care to individuals with chronic conditions can be
expensive. To save on costs, insurers essentially ration out health care.
They do this by using benefit utilization management policies to limit
access to more expensive treatments. Yet, insurers sometimes employ
benefit utilization management policies in a manner that excludes large
patient populations from accessing life-saving treatments in favor of
treatments that are typically older and may be inferior or are known to
produce adverse effects. Such policies interfere with the physicianpatient relationship in a detrimental manner and may violate both state
and federal laws. This Part discusses some of those commonly employed
benefit utilization management policies and the laws that the policies may
violate.
A. Step Therapy
Step therapy policies, which are also referred to as “fail first” policies,
require individuals to try and fail on less expensive treatments, sometimes
with adverse effects, before the insurer will cover the original, likely
12. This Article does not address self-funded employer plans, which are governed by the
Federal Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”), rather than state law.
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more expensive, treatment prescribed to them.13 Pursuant to medical
practice, individuals are supposed to begin with the safest and most costeffective treatment and then progress to riskier and costlier treatments.14
In reality, step therapy policies can be cruel and unethical. For instance,
a recent study showed that 45 percent of individuals who were prescribed
immunological agents and biologics were forced to first “step through” a
treatment with a black-box warning (i.e., a medication with a known risk
for a severe adverse reaction) before their insurers would cover the
prescribed treatment.15 Step therapy policies can also significantly delay
access to effective treatments, causing the individuals’ conditions to
worsen while they wait.16
1. The ACA’s Nondiscrimination Provision
President Obama signed the ACA into law on March 23, 2010 to
improve the accessibility of quality health care. As part of those efforts,
section 1557 of the ACA (i.e., the nondiscrimination provision) expressly
prohibits all entities principally engaged in providing or administering
health insurance coverage, including public and private insurers and
pharmacy benefit managers (“covered entities”), from excluding from
participation, denying a benefit for, or discriminating against any
individual on the basis of a health condition.17
On May 18, 2016, the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (“HHS”) issued a final rule implementing the nondiscrimination
provision, which clarified that covered entities are prohibited from
employing “marketing practices or benefit designs” 18 that discriminate
13. Paul Sisson, Bill Would Quicken Access to Newer Meds, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB. (Oct. 3,
2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/news/2015/oct/03/ab374-chronicdisease/.
14. Gary Branning et al., Formulary Management of Branded Drugs with and Without Boxed
Warnings Within Therapeutic Categories, 18 J. INT’L SOC’Y FOR PHARMACOECONOMICS &
OUTCOMES RES. A100, A100 (2015).
15. Id. at A100. Biologics are medical products made from natural sources (e.g., human,
animal, and microorganism) to prevent, diagnosis, or treat medical conditions. What Is a Biological
Product?,
FOOD
&
DRUG
ADMIN.,
http://www.fda.gov/
AboutFDA/Transparency/Basics/ucm194516.htm (last updated May 31, 2016).
16. See Fox Ins. Co. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1213–14 (2013)
(noting that the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) terminated a Medicare
contract because the defendant imposed benefit utilization management strategies, including step
therapy, to significantly delay patient access to needed medication, thereby placing patients in
imminent and serious risk).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2015); Callum v. CVS Health Corp., 137 F. Supp. 3d 817, 853 (D.S.C.
2015). The nondiscrimination provision contains a private cause of action. Callum, 137 F. Supp.
3d at 848.
18. Benefit design refers to the treatments covered by a health care plan and the restrictions
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on the basis of a health condition.19 For the purpose of this rule, covered
entities are those that operate a health program or activity that receives
federal funding and any entity established under the ACA to administer
health care (e.g., health care exchanges), including health insurers,
hospitals, health care clinics, and Medicaid agencies and contractors.20
Given that step therapy is a part of a health plan’s benefit design, if a
step therapy policy is required for most or all drugs used to treat a
particular condition in a manner that is inconsistent with medical
evidence, that policy may violate the nondiscrimination provision and its
implementing regulations.
Such a policy discriminates against
individuals with that condition and places an undue burden on them to
receive necessary therapies.21 It requires the individual to take a less than
optimally effective treatment for a period of time, resulting in a delay of
proper treatment.22 In one case, for example, a physician prescribed a
biologic infusion treatment to an individual with rheumatoid arthritis.23
The physician submitted proof that the medications the individual’s
insurer required her to step through were ineffective and that her
rheumatoid arthritis had progressed to the point where she lost her job;
could not drive or care for her son; and needed help with simple tasks,
such as bathing. Yet, her insurer required her to first attempt and “fail”
on six other drugs over the course of one year before she could gain
access to the originally prescribed biologic infusion treatment.24 This
step therapy policy may violate the nondiscrimination provision because
it is designed to create a burden on individuals with rheumatoid arthritis
and delay access to effective treatment.

placed on coverage of those treatments, including pharmacy tiers and any benefit utilization
management policies.
19. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 80 Fed. Reg. 54,172, 54,189 (Sept.
8, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
20. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (May 18, 2016)
(to be codified at 45 C.F.R. Part 92).
21. See OHIO DEP’T OF INS., NON-DISCRIMINATION IN BENEFIT DESIGN 5 (2015),
http://www.insurance.ohio.gov/Company/Documents/2015_NonDiscriminatory_Benefit_Design_QHP_Standards.pdf (clarifying nondiscrimination standards
under the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) and giving examples).
22. Spenser G. Benge, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: An Effective Means of
Combatting Health Insurers’ Discrimination Against Individuals with HIV/AIDS?, 13 IND.
HEALTH L. REV. 193, 225 (2016).
23. Arloishia Israel, Insurers Win, Patients Lose with Step Therapy, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER
(Dec. 14, 2015, 6:10 PM), http://www.charlotteobserver.com/opinion/op-ed/article49743935.html.
24. Id.
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2. The Medicaid Act: Reasonable Promptness Provision
Step therapy may also violate the “reasonable promptness” provision
of the Medicaid Act, which requires Medicaid plans to provide medical
assistance “with reasonable promptness to all eligible individuals.”25
Prior to the enactment of the ACA, several of the federal circuits had
interpreted the term “medical assistance” to mean only “financial
assistance” for medical services and not the medical services
themselves,26 serving to effectively foreclose most reasonable
promptness suits. But the ACA amended the Medicaid Act’s definition
of “medical assistance” to clarify that the term includes “payment of part
or all of the cost of . . . care and services or the care and services
themselves, or both.”27 Therefore, a Medicaid enrollee can potentially
bring a successful action pursuant to the reasonable promptness provision
of the Medicaid Act when medical assistance is not provided in a
reasonably prompt fashion (i.e., an insurer requires individuals to attempt
and fail on less expensive treatments before covering the more effective
treatments).28
The Medicaid Act does not define “reasonable promptness,” and the
few regulations related to the provision are not particularly
illuminating.29 For example, the regulations provide that the responsible
state agency must “furnish Medicaid promptly to recipients without any
delay caused by the agency’s administrative procedures,”30 and “continue
to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible individuals until they are
found ineligible.”31 The lack of regulatory clarity on the meaning of
reasonable promptness may be due to the fact that what qualifies as a
reasonably prompt provision of care depends entirely on the condition
that the care is treating.32
Given the provision’s vague language, courts have failed to formulate
a consistent standard in making reasonable promptness determinations.
Nonetheless, courts may find defendants liable for violating the
25. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2015); Jeffrey Chen, In the Nick of Time: Using the Reasonable
Promptness Provision to Challenge Medicaid Spending Cutbacks, 15 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. &
ETHICS 349, 349 (2015).
26. Chen, supra note 25, at 370.
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1396d(a) (2015) (emphasis added).
28. As used in this Article, the term “enrollee” means an individual who has enrolled in a private
or federally funded insurance plan, including Medicare, Medicaid, or marketplace exchange plans.
29. Chen, supra note 25, at 373.
30. 42 C.F.R. § 435.930(a) (2013).
31. Id. § 435.930(b).
32. See id. (“The agency must . . . [c]ontinue to furnish Medicaid regularly to all eligible
individuals until they are found to be ineligible.”).
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provision, which may lend support to a potential plaintiff’s case. For
example, Sobky v. Smoley supports the proposition that any delay in the
delivery of services is a violation of the provision. 33 There, the court
found the State of California liable for failing to comply with the
reasonable promptness provision where insufficient funding from
California’s Medicaid program caused providers of methadone
maintenance therapy to place eligible individuals with substance use
disorders on waiting lists for treatment.34
In Oklahoma Chapter of American Academy of Pediatrics v. Fogarty,
the Northern District of Oklahoma found that the defendant violated the
reasonable promptness provision when the plaintiffs offered substantial
evidence that the delays in treatment for children with specific conditions
[were] medically inappropriate.35 Furthermore, the plaintiffs showed that
system-wide delays for treatment existed and were unreasonable.36 This
case may suggest that a Medicaid program has violated the reasonable
promptness provision if a plaintiff can show that enrollees are subject to
“medically inappropriate” delays.37
These cases demonstrate that unreasonable delays to prescribed
treatment for Medicaid enrollees, such as the delays resulting from step
therapy policies, may give rise to a cause of action for a violation of the
reasonable promptness provision.
For example, step therapy
unreasonably delays access to treatment for Medicaid enrollees by
requiring enrollees to start on treatments that are less effective or not
effective at all, or ones that cause known adverse events before starting a
prescribed treatment. Furthermore, delays caused by step therapy
protocols unsupported by medical evidence that require enrollees to first
fail on medications with known, severe adverse effects, are not only
medically inappropriate, but also unethical. Therefore, Medicaid
enrollees may have a claim under the reasonable promptness provision of
the Medicaid statute if they cannot access the treatment prescribed to
them due to a burdensome step therapy policy.
3. State Claim Based on the Interference with the Physician-Patient
Relationship
Burdensome step therapy policies may meet the standards for
intentional interference with a contractual relationship (i.e., a common
33.
34.
35.
2005).
36.
37.

Id.; Sobky v. Smoley, 855 F. Supp. 1123, 1148 (E.D. Cal. 1994).
Sobky, 855 F. Supp. at 1140.
Okla. Chapter of Am. Acad. Pediatrics v. Fogarty, 366 F. Supp. 2d 1050, 1109 (N.D. Okla.
Id.
Chen, supra note 25, at 375.
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law tort) because they significantly disrupt the physician-patient
relationship, preventing physicians from fulfilling their duty and
affecting the health and well-being of patients.
According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, a claim for intentional
interference with a contractual relationship exists if (1) there is a valid
contract; (2) the defendant had knowledge of the contract; (3) the
defendant acted intentionally and improperly; and (4) the plaintiff was
injured by the defendant’s actions beyond the fact of the interference
itself (“Restatement elements”).38 A defendant’s liability “may arise
from improper motives or from the use of improper means.”39
The Restatement of Torts is relevant here because the physicianpatient relationship creates a contract, whether it be express or implied,
pursuant to which the physician must treat the patient with proper
professional skill and the patient must pay for such treatment.40 Once the
contractual relationship forms, the physician has a duty to bring skill and
care to treat the condition,41 and to make decisions in the best interest of
the patient.42 In Baptist Health v. Murphy, the Arkansas Supreme Court
considered the issue of intentional interference in the context of the
physician-patient relationship.43 In Murphy, the board of trustees of the
defendant, Baptist Health, instituted a policy that prohibited physicians
who owned an interest in a competing hospital from practicing at Baptist
Health.44 Pursuant to the policy, the plaintiffs-physicians sued for
tortious interference with a contractual relationship or business
expectancy when Baptist Health restricted the physicians from practicing
at Baptist Health because they owned an interest in a competing specialty
heart hospital.45 The Arkansas Supreme Court held that the hospital
38. United Truck Leasing Corp. v. Geltman, 551 N.E.2d 20, 21 (Mass. 1990).
39. Id.
40. AMY G. GORE ET AL., 61 AM. JURIS. § 130 (2d ed. 2017); J. Gregory Lennon, Easing the
Medical Malpractice Crisis: Restricting the Creation of Duty Through an Implied Doctor-Patient
Relationship, 7 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 363, 365 (2004).
41. GORE ET AL., supra note 40, § 130; Lennon, supra note 40, at 365.
42. See, e.g., STATE MED. BD. OF OHIO, STATEMENT OF THE STATE MEDICAL BOARD OF OHIO
ON
THE
CORPORATE
PRACTICE
OF
MEDICINE
2
(2012),
http://www.med.ohio.gov/Portals/0/DNN/PDF-FOLDERS/Laws-Rules/PositionStatements/Corporate-Practice-of-Medicine.pdf (“No matter the business entity, a physician must
exercise professional judgment to render medical services based on the best interest of the
patient.”); Edward P. Richards, The Police Power and the Regulation of Medical Practice: A
Historical Review and Guide for Medical Licensing Board Regulation of Physicians in ERISAQualified Managed Care Organizations, 8 ANNALS HEALTH L. 201, 234 (1999) (describing the
guiding principles behind medical licensing boards).
43. Baptist Health v. Murphy, 373 S.W.3d 269, 281–82 (Ark. 2010).
44. Id. at 275.
45. Id. at 281.
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tortiously interfered with the plaintiffs-physicians’ relationships with
their patients.46
Like the conflict of interest policy in Murphy, an insurer’s step therapy
policy could give rise to a patient’s or practitioner’s claim for tortious
interference. First, it is clear that a physician has a contractual
relationship with a patient where a physician agrees to provide care and
a patient agrees to accept care for a fee.47 It can be presumed that an
insurer has knowledge of the physician-patient relationship and intends
to interfere with that relationship when it requires compliance with a step
therapy policy.48 Step therapy policies inherently influence decision
making between patients and their doctors. By enforcing such policies,
insurers often require a physician to prescribe, and a patient to use and
fail on, a medication different than the one deemed to be in the patient’s
best interest.
As to the damages element required for a claim for intentional
interference with a contractual relationship, the defendant-hospital’s
conflict of interest policy injured the Murphy physicians by disrupting the
physician-patient relationship and causing a loss of professional fees.
Likewise, step therapy policies disrupt physicians’ relationships with
their patients because they take away a physician’s ability to make
individualized health care decisions in the best interest of the patient.
Furthermore, such policies increase the administrative burden and
expense because physicians who seek an exception or appeal a denial for
patients must spend time contacting the insurer.49 Physicians, nursing
staff, and clinical staff spend approximately three weeks, twenty-three
weeks, and forty-four weeks per year, respectively, interacting with
insurers.50 The time spent communicating with insurers results in less
time available to spend with patients, lower net professional fees, and
higher costs for patients.
From the patient’s perspective, the patient may experience harm to his
or her health. Step therapy policies negatively impact patient outcomes

46. Id. at 289.
47. Id. at 282.
48. See id. at 284 (holding that “a party is presumed to intend the natural and probable
consequences of his or her actions”).
49. Adrienne Chung et al., Does a “One-Size-Fits-All” Formulary Policy Make Sense?,
HEALTH AFF. BLOG (June 2, 2016), http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/06/02/does-a-one-size-fitsall-formulary-policy-make-sense/.
50. Lawrence P. Casalino et al., What Does It Cost Physician Practices to Interact with Health
Insurance
Plans?,
28
HEALTH
AFF.
W533,
W540
(2009),
http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/28/4/w533.full.pdf+html.
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through delays in treatment and higher health care costs.51 Some policies
require patients to fail on more than five different medications with
adverse events for nearly two years before insurers will provide coverage
for the prescribed medication.52 Furthermore, these policies result in
patients spending a significant amount of time on the phone, in doctors’
offices, and in pharmacies.
Lastly, to satisfy a prima facie case against an insurer for intentional
interference, the plaintiff must show that the insurer’s conduct is
improper. In Murphy, the court reviewed the circuit court’s extensive
findings of the hospital’s impropriety against the Restatement elements
for improper conduct. In short, the nature of Baptist Health’s conduct
was against public policy because its conflict of interest policy disrupted
the physician-patient relationship.53 In addition, the court held that the
physicians’ interest in physician-patient relationships and the continuity
of care outweighed Baptist Health’s interest in protecting its economic
viability.54 The court reasoned that while society has a strong interest in
Baptist Health’s continued viability, the evidence showed that its finances
were never at risk.55
When applying the Restatement elements to insurers’ use of step
therapy policies, the factors may weigh in favor of physicians and
patients. Physicians’ interests are in the physician-patient relationship
and satisfying their duty of care pursuant to that relationship. Patients
have an interest in their own health and well-being, as well as decreasing
the costs of health care. But insurers’ principal motive in utilizing step
therapy policies is to decrease their short-term costs. Insurers implement
these policies despite their negative effect on physicians and patients, and
without regard to the long-term benefits and cost-savings associated with
providing timely access to the prescribed treatment.
B. Adverse Tiering
Drug formularies (i.e., insurers’ lists of medications approved for
coverage) often classify medications into tiers based on price.56 While
insurers usually charge a flat-rate copayment for prescriptions on lower
51. Limiting Step Therapy Policies to Protect Patients, CAL. RHEUMATOLOGY ALLIANCE,
http://cqrcengage.com/cra/steptherapy (last visited May 7, 2017).
52. Id.
53. Baptist Health, 373 S.W.3d at 286.
54. Id. at 286–87.
55. Id. at 287.
56. Joseph J. Hylak-Reinholtz & Jay R. Naftzger, Is It Time to Shed a “Tier” for Four-Tier
Prescription Drug Formularies? Specialty Drug Tiers May Violate HIPAA’s Anti-Discrimination
Provisions and Statutory Goals, 32 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 22, 34 (2011).
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tiers,57 they may charge a percentage of the drug cost (i.e., coinsurance)
for prescriptions on upper tiers, sometimes referred to as “specialty
tiers.”58 Specialty tiers typically contain many innovative and life-saving
drugs that tend to be costlier.
While specialty tiers were once reserved for treatments of rare
diseases, they are now often used for drugs that treat chronic conditions,
including cancer, HIV, and rheumatoid arthritis.59
Given that
coinsurance in specialty tiers typically ranges from 20 to 50 percent of a
drug’s cost,60 consumers may be required to pay thousands of dollars a
month for vital medications.61 The ACA currently limits out-of-pocket
maximums for health care costs to $7,150 for individuals and $14,300 for
families for 2017 individual, small-group, large-group, and self-insured
plans.62 Nevertheless, a single treatment may cost over $12,750,
meaning that the family has the financial burden of paying that cost
upfront. Moreover, it is quite common for Medicare beneficiaries to
spend more than $600 per month on specialty medications.63
In a growing trend, insurers have placed most or all drugs that treat a
specific condition, including generics, on the highest cost specialty tiers,
making treatment for individuals with that illness unaffordable and
inaccessible.64 This practice is often referred to as “adverse tiering.” For
example, in 2015, 51 percent of silver plans placed all multiple sclerosis
drugs on a specialty tier (up from 42 percent in 2014).65 Likewise, a
recent study showed that most insurance plans in California, Florida,
Illinois, North Carolina, Texas, and Washington placed all, or nearly all,
57. Id. at 36–38.
58. Chad Brooker, Waging War on Specialty Pharmaceutical Tiering in Pharmacy Benefit
Design, 7 HEALTH L. & POL’Y BRIEF 25, 29 (2013).
59. DEL. HEALTH CARE COMM’N, SPECIALTY-TIER PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: REPORT TO THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY 2 (2012), http://dhss.delaware.gov/dhss/dhcc/files/tierdrugreport.pdf.
60. Brooker, supra note 58, at 29.
61. Id.
62. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,826 (Feb.
27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 153, 154, 155, 156, and 158); Out-of-Pocket
Maximum Limits, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://www.healthcare.gov/glossary/out-of-pocketmaximum-limit/ (last visited May 22, 2017).
63. Jack Hoadley et al., It Pays to Shop: Variation in Out-of-Pocket Costs for Medicare Part D
Enrollees in 2016, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Dec. 2, 2015, http://kff.org/report-section/it-pays-toshop-variation-in-out-of-pocket-costs-for-medicare-part-d-enrollees-in-2016-findings/.
64. HHS Notice of Benefit and Payment Parameters for 2016, 80 Fed. Reg. 10,750, 10,821,
10,823 (Feb. 27, 2015) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 144, 147, 153, 154, 155, 156, and 158).
65. AVALERE, AVALERE PLANSCAPE ANALYSIS OF PRESCRIPTION DRUG TIER PLACEMENT
AND
COST SHARING IN HEALTH INSURANCE EXCHANGE PLANS 4 (2015),
http://go.avalere.com/acton/attachment/12909/f-017c/1/-/-/-//20150211_Avalere%20Planscape%202015_Class%20Tiering%20Analysis.pdf.
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of twenty-two well-known cancer medications into the highest-cost tier.66
Higher cost sharing can often have a negative impact on plan enrollees
seeking coverage of treatments in specialty tiers, including skipping
doses or missing treatments, thereby resulting in adverse events and
development of drug resistance.67
1. The ACA’s Nondiscrimination and Preexisting Condition Provisions
Adverse tiering could violate the ACA’s nondiscrimination provision
and its implementing regulations. The ACA also prohibits insurers from
imposing a “preexisting condition exclusion,” which is “a limitation or
exclusion of benefits relating to a condition based on the fact that the
condition was present before the date of enrollment for such coverage,
whether or not any medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treatment was
recommended or received before such date.”68 Yet, insurers often use
adverse tiering to discourage individuals with preexisting conditions
from enrolling in health plans because the applicable treatments are
inadequately covered. Therefore, adverse tiering schemes could
effectively serve as preexisting-condition exclusions.
The ACA also prohibits insurers from employing “marketing practices
or benefit designs that have the effect of discouraging the enrollment in
such plans by individuals with significant health needs.” 69 A 2015 HHS
regulation further clarified that insurers may violate the
nondiscrimination provision if they place most or all drugs for a certain
condition on a formulary’s highest cost tier if there is no appropriate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the practice or without regard to the actual
cost the insurer pays for the drug.70 The Centers for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (“CMS”), which reportedly covers 100 million people
through Medicare, Medicaid, and other federal health care programs, has
emphasized this point.71 A representative of CMS stated that while
66. Julie Appleby, Cancer Meds Often Bring Big Out-of-Pocket Costs for Patients, Report
Finds, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Nov. 19, 2015), http://khn.org/news/cancer-meds-often-bring-bigout-of-pocket-costs-for-patients-report-finds/.
67. Administrative Complaint at 3, The AIDS Inst. v. Coventry Health Care, Inc., (May 29,
2014),
http://www.natap.org/2014/newsUpdates/NHeLPTheAIDSInstituteHIVcomplaintHHSOCR5.29.1
4copy.pdf [hereinafter AIDS Institute Administrative Complaint].
68. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-3(a) (2015).
69. Id. § 18031(c)(1)(a); 45 C.F.R. § 156.225(b) (2017).
70. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31,376, 54,189 (May
18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92).
71. See Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31,434 (stating
that “placing most or all prescription medications that are used to treat a specific condition on the
highest cost formulary tiers” is an example of a discriminatory benefit design); CMS Covers 100
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having a specialty tier is not discriminatory on its face, adverse tiering
may be discriminatory in application “when looking at the totality of the
circumstances.”72
In September 2016, the Center for Health Law and Policy Innovation
of Harvard Law School (“CHLPI”) and the AIDS Foundation of Chicago
filed an administrative complaint with the HHS Office of Civil Rights
(“OCR”) alleging that the cost-sharing design that Humana employed in
its marketplace exchange plans discriminated against individuals with
HIV in violation of the nondiscrimination provision, the preexisting
condition provision, and the ACA regulations.73 The complaint argued
that a benefit design may be discriminatory if it does not provide
meaningful access to a certain patient population. Access is not
meaningful if the patient population is not afforded the same
opportunities to benefit from the services that are available to others.74
The complaint stated that the insurer’s formulary placed sixteen of the
twenty-four most common HIV medications in its highest cost-sharing
tier, with coinsurance rates between 40 and 50 percent.75 Therefore, an
individual enrolled in Humana’s Illinois qualified health plan (“QHP”)
was allegedly required to spend between 8 and 14 percent of his or her
average monthly income for an HIV treatment regimen.76 By
comparison, Humana only required a fifty dollar copay for two similarly
priced chemotherapy medications, or around 1 percent of the Illinois
median household income.77 The groups argued that such costprohibitive adverse tiering subjected those with HIV to discrimination by
preventing meaningful access available to other patient populations.
Such policies also allegedly led individuals with HIV to avoid enrolling
in, or withdrawing from, Humana’s plans altogether, thereby serving as
a preexisting condition exclusion.78 While HHS has yet to respond to the
Million People, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/ (last visited Apr.
17, 2017). CMS has sole enforcement authority in four states and concurrent enforcement authority
in the remainder of states. Compliance and Enforcement, CTR. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID
SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/cciio/programs-and-initiatives/health-insurance-marketreforms/compliance.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2017).
72. Bob Herman, Aetna Revises HIV Drug Policy for All Exchange Plans, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Mar. 27, 2015), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20150327/NEWS/150329914.
73. Administrative Complaint at 2, Ctr. for Health Law & Policy Innovation v. Humana (Sept.
6, 2016), http://www.aidschicago.org/resources/content/9/2/5/documents/ocr-complaint-humana1.pdf.
74. Id. at 7.
75. Id. at 8.
76. Id. at 9.
77. Id. at 12.
78. Id. at 3.

11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Now or Never

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1055

complaint, Humana’s actions, if true, would be in direct conflict with the
nondiscrimination provision, the preexisting condition provision, and the
ACA’s implementing regulations.
2. The Federal Rehabilitation Act
Adverse tiering may also violate the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(“Rehab Act”). The Rehab Act prohibits programs and services that
receive federal funds from providing “benefits or services in a manner
that limits or has the effect of limiting the participation of qualified
persons with disabilities.”79 It states that no otherwise qualified
individual with a disability “shall, solely by reason of his or her disability,
be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under a program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”80 The Rehab Act’s implementing regulations
define “disability” as (1) a physical or mental impairment that
substantially limits one or more of the major life activities of such
individual; (2) a record of such impairment; or (3) being regarded as
having such impairment.81 The Rehab Act applies to federally funded
health plans and if any such health plan imposes a discriminatory adverse
tiering policy, plan enrollees may be able to bring a claim under the
Rehab Act.82
In Alexander v. Choate, Medicaid recipients challenged Tennessee’s
decision to reduce the annual cap on reimbursed hospital days from
twenty to fourteen days.83 The plaintiffs argued that the reduction had a
disproportionate effect on individuals with disabilities in violation of the
Rehab Act. The court balanced the individuals’ medical needs against
the State’s burden to determine whether the plaintiffs had “meaningful
access” to health care.84 The court cited three relevant factors in its
analysis of meaningful access: (1) the reductions must not “have a
particular exclusionary effect” on an individual with a disability; (2) the
limitation must be neutral on its face; and (3) the individual must be able
to benefit meaningfully from the coverage, although it ultimately ruled in
favor of the defendants finding that the reduction in annual inpatient
79. 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(a)(iv) (2004).
80. 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) (2015).
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g) (2011); 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(d) (2004).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 18116 (2015). The ACA explicitly states that the Rehab Act applies to federally
funded health plans, clearing up previous ambiguity. Id.
83. Alexander Abbe, “Meaningful Access” to Health Care and the Remedies Available to
Medicaid Managed Care Recipients Under the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, 147 U. PENN. L.
R. 1161, 1166 (1999).
84. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 301 (1985).
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hospital days did not result in discrimination.85
In Katie A., ex rel. Ludin v. Los Angeles City, the Ninth Circuit further
elaborated on the Choate test that the required services must be provided
in “an effective manner.”86 A plan benefit design may be considered
ineffective for the purposes of the Rehab Act if it does not provide the
individual with a disability with the same opportunities to benefit from
the services that are available to others.87
Pursuant to the opinions of the courts, it can be argued that Medicare,
Medicaid, and exchange plans deny meaningful access to health care for
individuals with disabilities if they employ adverse tiering, thereby
violating the Rehab Act. For example, CHLPI and the AIDS Research
Consortium of Atlanta filed an administrative complaint with OCR in
September 2016 alleging that Humana, through its exchange plans,
unlawfully discriminated against individuals with HIV in violation of the
Rehab Act.88 The complainants alleged that Humana placed sixteen out
of the twenty-two HIV medications on the highest cost-sharing tier within
each of its five QHPs, thereby intentionally making such medications
unaffordable for the majority of individuals with HIV on that plan.89 The
groups provided statistics showing that Humana enrollees with HIV had
to spend between 17 and 30 percent of the median monthly income in
Georgia to receive their medications.90 This problem is exacerbated by
the fact that over 18 percent of Georgia residents live in poverty, and 23
percent of those impoverished residents have HIV.91
The complainants also argued that Humana’s benefit design is outside
of market norms in Georgia, with the majority of other insurers in the
state offering HIV drug benefits at a significantly lower cost than
Humana. The complainants stated that these prohibitively high costsharing levels discourage any reasonable individual with HIV from
enrolling or staying in Humana’s QHPs, amounting to a de facto denial
of meaningful access in violation of the Rehab Act.92 This case is
currently pending.
In sum, adverse tiering may violate the Rehab Act because such a
85. Id. at 302.
86. Katie A. v. L.A. Cty., 481 F.3d 1150, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007); Administrative Complaint, Ctr.
for
Health
L.
&
Pol’y
Innovation
v.
Humana
(Sept.
6,
2016),
http://media.bizj.us/view/img/10145208/ga-humana.pdf.
87. Katie A., 481 F.3d at 1159.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
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policy often limits qualified persons with disabilities from participating
properly in their health plans.
3. State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Adverse tiering may also violate state unfair and deceptive trade
practice (“UDTP”) laws, which are generally intended to protect
consumers from predatory business practices.93 Though UDTP laws vary
from state to state, every state has at least one consumer protection law
that prohibits deceptive trade practices, such as bait-and-switch tactics,
false or misleading advertising, and other fraudulent marketing
practices.94 A majority of states prohibit unfair acts and practices, and a
minority of states have laws prohibiting unconscionable business
practices.95
States also have UDTP laws that target specific industries and
practices.96 For example, a Florida law prohibits unfair practices in the
underwriting of insurance with respect to HIV by preventing health
insurance policies from limiting coverage for medications or treatments
for HIV.97 Therefore, this Florida law reduces the possibility that an
insurer could unfairly discriminate against an individual purchasing
insurance.
In 2014, the AIDS Institute and the National Health Law Program filed
a complaint with the Florida Office of Insurance Regulations (“OIR”)
against four Florida insurers—Coventry Health Care, Cigna, Humana,
and Preferred Medical.98 The complainants alleged that the insurers
placed all drugs used to treat HIV, including generics, in the highest costsharing tier for which a 40–50 percent coinsurance applied.99 In
comparison, other insurers varied tiering, or placed HIV drugs on more
affordable tiers.100 The complainants argued that the defendantsinsurers’ policies violated Florida law by discriminating against
93. CAROLYN L. CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. INC, CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES: A 50-STATE REPORT ON UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES STATUTES 13
(2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/car_sales/UDAP_Report_Feb09.pdf.
94. JULIE RALSTON AOKI, PUB. HEALTH LAW CTR. AT WILLIAM MITCHELL COLL. OF LAW,
CONSUMER PROTECTION: AN OVERVIEW OF STATE LAWS AND ENFORCEMENT 1 (2010),
http://publichealthlawcenter.org/sites/default/files/resources/phlc-fs-agconsumer-2010.pdf.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.429 (2013); Consent Order, In Re Cigna Health & Life Ins. Co., No.
162232-14-CO (Off. of Ins. Reg. 2014), http://www.floir.com/siteDocuments/Cigna162232-14CO.pdf.
98. AIDS Institute Administrative Complaint, supra note 67, at 2.
99. Id. at 9.
100. Id.
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individuals with HIV and deterring such individuals from enrolling in the
insurers’ QHPs. Several months after the public interest groups filed the
complaint, the OIR ultimately settled with all four insurers without
making any finding on whether the insurers violated Florida law. But
subsequent to the settlement, each insurer agreed to make changes to its
drug benefit designs.
Cigna agreed to relocate generic HIV medications to a lower cost tier
and cap customers’ costs on certain drugs to $200 per month.101 It also
agreed to remove the thirty-day supply limit per prescription for HIV
medications. Similarly, Humana agreed to limit its subscribers’ costsharing responsibilities for all HIV medications and move all such
medications below a certain cost to a lower tier.102 The Cigna and
Humana agreements applied only to their exchange plans in Florida,
however.103 Aetna (which wholly owns Coventry Health) agreed to
move nearly all HIV medications across all of its exchange plans
nationwide to lower-cost generic or nonpreferred tiers, effective June 1,
2015.104 Preferred Medical, the last to respond, issued a letter in early
2015 stating that it would cap out-of-pocket costs at $200 per month for
certain HIV medications.105
Subsequent to the settlement agreements, OIR issued a notice in spring
2015 to all Florida insurers warning them that OIR would begin
“reviewing 2016 [QHPs] for possible discriminatory practices in how
they cover all prescription medications,” and that the office “would deem
plans as discriminatory if the tiered formulary of HIV medications was
not at least as favorable as the state’s benchmark plan.” 106 The action
taken by OIR is a strong indication that adverse tiering practices may
violate UDTP laws, such as Florida law.

101. Associated Press, Cigna Changes Plan Amid HIV Drug Complaint, MOD. HEALTHCARE
(Nov. 8, 2014), http://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20141108/INFO/311089945.
102. Letter from Steve DeRaleau, President, HumanaOne, & Kevin M. McCarty, Comm’r, Fla.
Office of Ins. Regulation, to Kevin M. McCarty, Comm’r, Fla. Office of Ins. Regulation (Dec. 15,
2014),
http://www.theaidsinstitute.org/sites/default/files/attachments/Humana%20Medical%20Plan%20a
nd%20OIR%20agreement%20dec%202014.pdf.
103. Herman, supra note 72.
104. Id.
105. Letter from Tamara Meyerson, President & CEO, Preferred Med. Plan, to Kevin M.
McCarty,
Comm’r,
Fla.
Office
of
Ins.
Regulation
(Jan.
14,
2015),
http://www.miamiherald.com/news/healthcare/article7893081.ece/binary/Preferred%20OIR%20Letter.pdf.
106. Daylina Miller, Insurance Regulators to Cap HIV Drug Costs, HEALTH NEWS FLA. (June
29, 2015), http://health.wusf.usf.edu/post/insurance-regulators-cap-hiv-drug-costs#stream/0.
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C. Nonmedical Switching
Nonmedical switching occurs when an insurer requires a stable patient
to switch from his or her current, effective medication to a cheaper,
alternative drug.107 An insurer effectuates nonmedical switching by
moving a drug to a higher cost tier, increasing the out-of-pocket costs
owed after the plan year has begun, or dropping a medication from the
formulary altogether. Nonmedical switching does not involve switching
a patient from a brand-name drug to a generic drug, but instead, from one
drug to an entirely different, therapeutic equivalent.108 Nonmedical
switching is done without consideration of the medical repercussions or
reasoning behind the prescriber’s selection of the original medication,
and often without the prescriber’s knowledge.109
Recent studies have determined that nonmedical switching does not
save money or maintain quality of care.110 Instead, nonmedical switching
disrupts the individual’s medication stability, which can cause adverse
reactions and loss of effectiveness, resulting in high-cost medical
outcomes.111 Yet, many plans continue to employ this bait-and-switch
tactic. For example, half of the plans in a 2015 study revised their
formularies after the plan year began.112 Of the forty-one plans with
revised formularies, thirty-three reduced drug coverage, twenty-seven
eliminated coverage for up to seven medications across classes, and six
plans removed between fifteen and fifty-seven products, reducing
formulary coverage by 6 percent to 63 percent.113

107. Non-Medical
Switching,
COALITION
ST.
RHEUMATOLOGY
ORG.,
http://www.csro.info/Switching (last visited May 7, 2017).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. See, e.g., Bryan R. Cote & Elizabeth A. Petersen, Impact of Therapeutic Switching in LongTerm Care, 14 AM. J. MANAGED CARE SP23, SP23 (2008) (concluding that nonmedical switching
in long-term care settings increased administrative time, side effects, and downstream costs to
plans); D.T. Rubin et al., P354 Analysis of Outcomes After Non-Medical Switching of Anti-Tumor
Necrosis Factor Agents, EUR. CROHN’S & COLITIS ORG. (2015), https://www.eccoibd.eu/index.php/publications/congress-abstract-s/abstracts-2015/item/p354-analysis-ofoutcomes-after-non-medical-switching-of-anti-tumor-necrosis-factor-agents.html (finding that
“non-medical switching of anti-TNF agents was associated with an increase in side effects and lack
of efficacy that led to subsequent treatment change as well as increases in health care utilization”).
111. Non-Medical Switching, supra note 107.
112. AVALERE, supra note 65.
113. Karyn Schwartz, New Analysis: Midyear Formulary Changes in Marketplace Plans Can
Significantly Reduce Access to Needed Medications for Patients, PHRMA (Feb. 5, 2015),
http://catalyst.phrma.org/new-analysis-midyear-formulary-changes-in-marketplace-plans-cansignificantly-reduce-access-to-needed-medications-for-patients.
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1. State Breach of Contract Claim
An insurance policy is a contract between the insurer and the enrollee;
therefore, the insurer has a duty to honor the plan terms as they are written
at the start of the plan year, including terms pertaining to the drug
formulary, drug tiers, and cost-sharing structure.114 Absent a contract
provision granting the insurer a right to unilaterally modify these terms,
the insurer breaches its duty to honor the plan language when it engages
in nonmedical switching practices. In some states, even if the contract
contains a provision permitting a unilateral modification to the plan, such
provision may not be valid.115 For example, Utah law states that a
modification of an insurance contract during the term of the policy must
be in writing and agreed to by the parties against whose interest the
modification operates.116
Nonmedical switching may constitute a breach of contract because it
is a unilateral change to an insurance policy after the enrollee has enrolled
in a plan. To prevail on a claim for breach of contract, the plan enrollee
must establish the existence of a contract, an obligation or duty arising
out of the contract, a breach of that obligation, and damages caused by
the breach.117
Unilateral modifications often cause individuals to incur damages due
to the forced change in medication. These damages come in many forms,
including health complications due to the regimen change, increased
emergency room visits, lab tests, and other costly interventions. For
example, in Taub v. Blue Cross of California, an insurer sent a letter two
months into the plan year to its enrollees stating that it planned to
unilaterally reduce the plan’s coverage scope by increasing the deductible
from $1,500 to $1,750. As a result, the plaintiffs filed a suit and argued
that the insurer breached its contract with its enrollees by unilaterally
changing annual deductibles, copay obligations, and other plan terms and
benefits after the plan year had begun, thereby severely degrading the
level and quality of health services that enrollees were able to access.118
The insurer argued that its contracts permitted the plan increases with
proper notice. The plaintiffs alleged that the insurer breached the terms
114. Anderson v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 443 N.W.2d 546, 549 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989).
115. Seymour v. Blue Cross/Blue Shield, 988 F.2d 1020, 1024 (10th Cir. 1993).
116. See id. (discussing UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-19-26 (repealed 1985)). It should be noted that
this statute created an exemption for ERISA plans.
117. Tsintolas Realty Co. v. Mendez, 984 A.2d 181, 187 (D.C. 2009).
118. Taub v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC457809 (May 31, 2015),
http://www.consumerwatchdog.org/resources/kassouf_taub__settlement_agreement.5.29.15_noe.pdf (class settlement agreement and release) [hereinafter
Taub, settlement agreement].
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and provisions of the health insurance contract by refusing to pay for
benefits promised under the contract.119 The case settled, and in October
2015, Anthem agreed to reimburse 50,000 consumers, totaling around
$8.3 million.120 In addition, Anthem agreed to refrain from making
subsequent mid-year changes to deductibles, copays, or other plan terms
in the future, thereby holding the insurer accountable for the promises it
made in the insurance contract.121
In sum, if an insurer implements nonmedical switching by dropping a
medication from the policy’s formulary, increasing out-of-pocket
spending, or placing the medication on a higher cost tier, it is unilaterally
modifying its policy after the plan year has begun. The enrollee incurs
damages if an insurer requires an enrollee to pay additional out-of-pocket
costs, endure adverse events, or take a different medication. Therefore,
given that the policy is a contract between the enrollee and the insurer,
the enrollee may have a claim for breach of contract, depending on the
contract terms and the jurisdiction.
2. State Breach of Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing Claim
Nonmedical switching policies may also result in a breach of duty of
good faith and fair dealing.122 Every contract imposes a duty of good
faith and fair dealing,123 which requires both honesty and reasonableness
in the enforcement of the contract.124 This duty prevents one contracting
party from unfairly frustrating the other party’s right to receive the
benefits of the agreement actually made.125 Courts have found that an
insurer has an implied-in-law duty to act in good faith and deal fairly with
the plan enrollee to ensure that the enrollee receives the policy
benefits.126 This protection is in place largely because the enrollee lacks
119. Id.
120. Samantha Masunaga, Anthem Blue Cross to Repay $8.3 Million to California Customers,
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2015, 11:55 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-blue-crosssettlement-20151027-story.html (discussing the settlement agreed to by Anthem Blue Cross after
accusations of breach of contract and engaging in unfair business practices).
121. Id.
122. It is important to note that the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists for all
contracts. But there is a related tort, referred to as “insurance bad faith.” Some courts have
conflated the two concepts. This Part refers only to the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, whereas the tort of insurance bad faith is discussed in detail, infra, Part I.D.5.
123. It should be noted that ERISA preempts any state law claims for breach of duty of good
faith and fair dealing. Dockter v. Aetna Life Co., 510 U.S. 917, 919 (1993). Therefore, individuals
with employer-sponsored plans should not bring this claim. Id.
124. Florence Urgent Care v. Healthspan, Inc., 445 F.Supp.2d 871, 879 (S.D. Ohio 2006).
125. Guz v. Bechtel Nat’l, Inc., 8 P.3d 1089, 1111–12 (Cal. 2000).
126. E.g., Badillo v. Mid Century Ins. Co., 121 P.3d 1080, 1093 (Okla. 2005); Christian v. Am.
Home Assurance Co., 577 P.2d 899, 901 (Okla. 1977). In the Fifth Circuit, an insurer breaches the
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bargaining power and cannot protect himself or herself from the kinds of
hardships that an insurer may impose (e.g., nonmedical switching
policies).127
When nonmedical switching occurs, either when an insurer drops a
medication from a formulary or increases out-of-pocket costs, the insurer
breaches its duty to act in good faith and deal fairly because the insurer
is frustrating the ability of the enrollee to receive the benefits originally
anticipated when the individual signed up for that insurance policy. For
example, in Taub,128 the plaintiffs alleged that the defendant-insurer
breached its duty of good faith and fair dealing because it unreasonably
changed the scope of coverage under the health insurance contracts after
the plan year had begun, and denied enrollees the coverage that they
purchased for the entire year, which led to denials of enrollees’ insurance
coverage claims.129 As the proximate result of such unreasonable and
bad faith conduct, plaintiffs suffered damages.130
In sum, given that insurers contract with plan enrollees, they owe the
enrollees a duty of good faith and fair dealing. This duty requires insurers
to reasonably guarantee that the enrollees will receive the benefits
promised to them. When insurers implement nonmedical switching
policies, individuals cannot access medications that the insurer originally
promised to cover with the agreed-upon out-of-pocket costs, thereby
breaching the duty to act in good faith and deal fairly. Therefore,
nonmedical switching could result in a claim for bad faith.
3. State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Additionally, nonmedical switching may violate states’ UDTP laws.131
For example, in 2011, plan enrollees filed a class action in California
against Anthem Blue Cross alleging that Anthem used unlawful bait-andswitch tactics to dramatically increase annual deductibles and other
yearly out-of-pocket costs after the plan year had begun, in violation of
California’s Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”) and Unfair

duty of good faith and fair dealing if it “has no reasonable basis for denying or delaying payment
of a claim.” Henry v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 503 F.3d 425, 429 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Therefore, in the Fifth Circuit, a claim alleging a breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing
against an insurer will likely fail if the insurer had any reasonable basis for denying coverage. Id.
127. Christian, 577 P.2d at 902; Fletcher v. W. Nat’l Life Ins. Co, 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 403–04
(1970).
128. For the facts in this case, see supra Part I.C.1.
129. Taub, settlement agreement, supra note 118.
130. Id.
131. See infra Part III.B.4 (discussing state legislation aimed at limiting specialty tiers).

11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Now or Never

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1063

Competition Law (“UCL”).132 The complaint stated that Anthem
violated the CLRA. The plaintiffs further alleged that Anthem marketed
its health plans in a misleading manner by stating the plan had “annual”
deductibles and other “yearly” benefits and out-of-pocket costs when it
did not. The complaint also stated that the defendant unilaterally
increased its annual deductibles and out-of-pocket costs after the plan
year had begun, thereby forcing plan enrollees to pay more than the plan
initially stated; adopted a new contract term that allowed the insurer to
change its plan as long as it provided sixty days’ notice to enrollees; and
advertised particular services without the intent to sell them.133
Additionally, the plaintiffs argued that Anthem violated the UCL by
engaging in unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent business practices, including
advertising and soliciting business in an untrue, misleading, and
deceptive manner. For example, the plaintiffs argued that the defendant
used deceptive coverage descriptions regarding annual deductibles and
out-of-pocket costs and benefits; made inaccurate representations about
coverage offered; and misleadingly implied that contract terms and
benefits remained unchanged throughout a calendar year.134
The plaintiffs alleged that they suffered harm as a result of these
practices because they had to pay significantly more out-of-pocket costs
than they initially agreed.135 In April 2015, Anthem settled the class
action by agreeing to pay the plaintiffs up to $8.2 million.136 Anthem
also agreed that, in the future, it would not make any material
modifications after the plan year began to any California-issued
individual health plans, unless a change in regulation or law supported
such mid-calendar-year modifications.137
Nonmedical switching is a unilateral modification to a health plan,
often executed in the middle of a plan year, and is analogous to the
unilateral modifications at issue in the Anthem Blue Cross class action
lawsuit. Enrollees rely on representations and marketing materials
regarding the cost and availability of medications when deciding whether
to purchase a health insurance plan. By unilaterally changing a drug
formulary, removing a drug from the formulary altogether, or increasing
cost sharing for the drug, an insurer arguably changes the terms of the
plan and forces the plan enrollee either to pay more than promised or to
132. Complaint, Kassouf v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC473408, 2011 WL 5561811 (Cal. App.
Dep’t Super. Ct. Nov. 4, 2011).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Masunaga, supra note 120.
137. Id.
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change the course of treatment and put his or her health at risk. These
actions are unfair and deceptive and, therefore, may be actionable under
UDTP laws.
D. Prior Authorization
Prior authorization policies require a physician or a plan enrollee to
obtain the insurer’s advance approval before the insurer will cover the
cost of certain treatments and medications.138 After the request, the
insurer then conducts a review to determine if the treatment is medically
necessary. While the definition of “medical necessity” varies from plan
to plan, the following definition from New Mexico Administrative Code
is an example:
[H]ealth care services determined by a provider, in consultation with
the health care insurer, to be appropriate or necessary, according to any
applicable generally accepted principles and practices of good medical
care or practice guidelines developed by the federal government,
national or professional medical societies, boards and associations, or
any applicable clinical protocols or practice guidelines developed by the
health care insurer consistent with such federal, national, and
professional practice guidelines, for the diagnosis or direct care and
treatment of a physical, behavioral, or mental health condition, illness,
injury, or disease.139

The process is often burdensome and can delay or interrupt care, waste
time, and complicate medical decisions.140 It often involves completing
various forms using outdated modes of communication (e.g., paper copies
submitted via mail or fax) and lengthy follow-up calls.141 A recent study
showed that the cost of conducting a standard medical-necessity review
often exceeds the savings generated in most areas of medicine.142
According to a national survey, the prior authorization process costs the
138. Philippe Saxe, Commentary: Time to Reform Costly, Burdensome Prior Authorization and
‘First Fail’ Protocols, PALM BEACH POST (Mar. 2, 2014, 12:00 AM),
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/news/opinion/commentary-time-to-reform-costlyburdensome-prior-/nd3Zz/.
139. N.M. CODE R. § 13.10.17.7(AA) (LexisNexis 2017); Ironworkers Local Union 68 v.
Astrazeneca Pharm., 634 F.3d 1352, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2011).
140. John Commins, Prior Authorization Hurts Patient Care, AMA Survey Finds, HEALTH
LEADERS MEDIA (Nov. 23, 2010), http://healthleadersmedia.com/content/PHY-259364/PriorAuthorization-Hurts-Patient-Care-AMA-Survey-Finds.
141. AM. MED. ASS’N, STANDARDIZATION OF PRIOR AUTHORIZATION PROCESS FOR MEDICAL
SERVICES
WHITE
PAPER
10–11
(June
2011),
http://massneuro.org/Resources/Transfer%20from%20old%20sit/AMA%20White%20Paper%20
on%20Standardizing%20Prior%20Authorization.pdf [hereinafter AMA WHITE PAPER].
142. Mark A. Hall, State Regulation of Medical Necessity: The Case of Weight-Reduction
Surgery, 53 DUKE L.J. 653, 664 (2003).
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United States health care system an estimated $23–31 billion each
year.143
Moreover, insurers sometimes make prior authorization
determinations that are inconsistent with medical standards of care and
clinical recommendations. A medical-necessity determination may place
too much weight on cost savings rather than on the individual needs of
plan enrollees, and initial determinations are often made by insurance
representatives without medical training.144
The prior authorization process is time consuming and can impose a
significant impediment to health care. Physicians spend an average of
twenty hours per week completing paperwork to satisfy prior
authorization requirements for treatments and tests, and it may be weeks
before a physician receives a response, thereby causing an unnecessary
delay in care.145 Even a short-term delay in access to medications for
conditions such as HIV, cancer, and seizures poses a serious risk to the
health and safety of plan enrollees, including permanent damage or
death.146
Additionally, more than half the physicians experience a 20 percent
rejection rate from insurers on first-time prior authorization requests for
medications.147 Oftentimes, each insurer may require a different form for
each drug prescribed. On top of that, these forms differ from insurer to
insurer. The sheer number of forms creates wide room for error, thereby
resulting in denials. If the insurer rejects the request for prior
authorization, the enrollee can appeal, the provider can recommend an
alternative treatment for which he or she might have to restart the prior
authorization process from the beginning, the enrollee can pay for the
service out of pocket, or, in the worse scenarios, the enrollee might give
up and never receive the necessary treatment. For these reasons,
approximately 76 percent of physicians have switched treatments at least
once to avoid the prior authorization process.148 As a result, enrollees
143. Christopher P. Morley et al., The Impact of Prior Authorization Requirements on Primary
Care Physicians’ Offices: Report of Two Parallel Network Studies, 26 J. AM. BOARD FAM. MED.
93, 93 (2013).
144. AMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 141, at 21.
145. Id.
146. Letter from Brenda Tranchida, Dir., Program Compliance & Oversight Grp., Ctr. for
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., to Kary Shankar, CEO, Senior Official for Contracting, Fox Ins. Co.
(Mar. 9, 2010), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/MCRAdvPartDEnrolData/Downloads/Fox_Termination_Letter.pdf
[hereinafter
Letter from Tranchida to Shankar].
147. AMA WHITE PAPER, supra note 141, at 21.
148. FROST & SULLIVAN, THE IMPACT OF THE PRIOR AUTHORIZATION PROCESS ON BRANDED
MEDICATIONS: PHYSICIAN REFERENCE, PHARMACIST EFFICIENCY AND BRAND MARKET SHARE
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receive the treatment dictated by insurers instead of receiving the best
treatment for their condition as determined by their physicians.
1. The Medicaid Act’s Payment for Covered Outpatient Drugs
Provision
Certain prior authorization policies may violate the Federal Medicaid
Act’s section on the payment for covered outpatient drugs. The statute
states that if the United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)
approves a drug and the drug’s manufacturer has a rebate agreement with
HHS, then the drug must be covered by state Medicaid programs,
consistent with FDA labeling, and without discrimination in drug
coverage.149 A state “may not arbitrarily deny or reduce the amount,
duration, or scope of a required service . . . to an otherwise eligible
beneficiary solely because of the diagnosis, type of illness, or
condition.”150 A Medicaid program must make a drug available
whenever medically necessary. But though available, prior authorization
may limit payment to the drug’s FDA-approved uses.151 If the insurer
denies treatment by rejecting the prior authorization request, the
Medicaid program must give written notice explaining the reason for
denial, provide an appeal, and allow a hearing to the Medicaid
enrollee.152 Despite these requirements, many states have adopted
cumbersome, and potentially illegal, prior authorization procedures.
In B.E. & A.R. v. Teeter, Medicaid enrollees brought suit against the
Washington State Health Care Authority (“WHCA”) (i.e., the state
Medicaid program) for arbitrarily restricting access to hepatitis C
medications.153 In their motion for a preliminary injunction, the plaintiffs
alleged that the WHCA had instituted overly burdensome prior
authorization requirements in violation of the Medicaid Act.154 The
WHCA limited access to a medication that could not only prevent
progression of hepatitis C, but could cure the disease altogether in more
than 90 percent of individuals, by providing coverage of that medication
4,
https://epascorecard.covermymeds.com/images/FrostSullivanPrior%20AuthorizationWhitepaper
%20FINAL.pdf (last visited May 7, 2017).
149. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8 (2016).
150. 42 C.F.R. § 440.230 (2012).
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1396r–8.42(d)(4) (2016); 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (2012).
152. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(3) (2016); 42 C.F.R § 431.200 (2017);
42 C.F.R § 431.221 (2017).
153. B.E. & A.R. v. Teeter, No. C16-227-JCC, 2016 WL 3033500, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 27,
2016).
154. Id.
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to only enrollees who had a high fibrosis score (i.e., those whose disease
had progressed to the point of liver damage severe enough to require a
liver transplant).155 Pursuant to the WHCA’s restriction on this hepatitis
C medication, the plaintiffs alleged that the WHCA’s prior authorization
policies (1) excluded qualified Medicaid recipients from medically
necessary treatment; (2) discriminated among similarly situated Medicaid
recipients; and (3) failed to provide medically necessary treatment with
reasonable promptness.156
The plaintiffs argued that the medication was medically necessary
regardless of a plan enrollee’s fibrosis score and unlimited access to it
was consistent with the standard of care. Pursuant to the Washington
Administrative Code, the WHCA determines whether a service is
medically necessary by rating the evidence of a service’s effectiveness
and safety with a score from “A” to “D.”157 If the service receives a grade
of “A” or “B,” then it must be approved so long as it does not subject the
enrollee “to a greater risk of mortality or morbidity” and “is not more
costly” when compared to an equally effective treatment.158 Though the
WHCA gave the medication at issue an “A,” and conceded that there was
no “equally effective treatment” available, the WHCA offered
“monitoring” to enrollees without a high fibrosis score as the “equally
effective treatment.”159 But the plaintiffs argued that monitoring alone
was not equally effective because waiting until an enrollee’s liver is
damaged before covering the medication is harmful to the enrollee’s
health and significantly increases the risk of both morbidity and
mortality.160
The court found that the plaintiffs’ evidence would likely establish that
the WHCA failed to follow its own definition of medical necessity by
merely providing monitoring to certain individuals based on levels of
liver damage in lieu of the highly effective medication.161 The court cited
CMS’ 2015 Notice—“Assuring Medicaid Beneficiaries Access to
Hepatitis C Drugs”—in which CMS expressed concern that some states,
contrary to statutory requirements, restricted access to hepatitis C
medications by imposing prior authorization coverage conditions that
unreasonably restricted access to those drugs, such as limiting treatment
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.

Id.
Id.
WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 182-501-0165 (2017).
Id. § 182-501-0165(6) (2017); Teeter, 2016 WL 3033500, at *2–3.
Teeter, 2016 WL 3033500, at *3.
Id. at *4–5.
Id. at *3–5.
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based on the extent of an enrollee’s liver damage.162 Ultimately, the court
granted the plaintiffs’ motion for preliminary injunction, finding that the
plaintiffs were likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an
injunction; they were likely to succeed on the merits of their case; a
balancing of equities favored the plaintiffs over the state agency; and an
injunction would be in the public interest. The court noted that when
faced with “a conflict between financial concerns and human suffering,
[it had] little difficulty concluding that the balance of hardships tips
decidedly in the plaintiffs’ favor.”163 As such, the court enjoined the
WHRC from continuing to apply its overly burdensome prior
authorization policy and required the agency to provide coverage for
prescription medications for hepatitis C without regard to the extent of
liver damage.164
2. The Medicaid Act’s Reasonable Promptness Provision
Prior authorization requirements that delay access to medically
necessary prescription drugs may also violate the reasonable promptness
provision of the Medicaid Act.165 In some instances, the delay results
from a lack of established timelines to respond to prior authorization
requests, giving the program leeway to take as long as it wants to provide
an answer. In the absence of a specific regulation requiring an established
timeline, courts have approved decrees or imposed time limits for the
processing of prior authorization requests for Medicaid-covered
services.166
For example, in Ladd v. Thomas, Medicaid recipients sued the
Commissioner of the Connecticut State Department of Social Services
(“DSS”) for violating the Federal Medicaid Act, including the reasonable
162. Id.; DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., CTRS. FOR MEDICAID & CHIP SERVS., MEDICAID
DRUG REBATE PROGRAM NOTICE: ASSURING MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES ACCESS TO HEPATITIS C
DRUGS
(2015),
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/bytopics/prescription-drugs/downloads/rx-releases/state-releases/state-rel-172.pdf.
163. Teeter, 2016 WL 3033500, at *6 (quoting Lopez v. Heckler, 713 F.2d 1432, 1437 (9th Cir.
1983).
164. Other states, including Delaware, Florida, Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania,
have taken measures to remove burdensome prior authorization processes for individuals with
hepatitis C. Judith Graham, Medicaid, Private Insurers Begin to Lift Curbs on Pricey Hepatitis C
Drugs, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (July 5, 2016), http://khn.org/news/medicaid-private-insurersbegin-to-lift-curbs-on-pricey-hepatitis-c-drugs/; Jen Rini, State Changes Hep C Medication
Guidelines,
Avoids
Lawsuit,
NEWS
J.
(June
10,
2016,
10:53
AM),
http://www.delawareonline.com/story/news/health/2016/06/07/state-changes-hep-c-medicationguidelines-avoids-lawsuit/85554396/.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(8) (2016); see supra Part I.A.2 (discussing the reasonable
promptness provision).
166. Kirk T. v. Houstoun, No. 99-3253, 2000 WL 830731, at *3 (E.D. Pa. June 27, 2000).
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promptness provision.167 The state Medicaid regulations required prior
authorization for all rentals of durable medical equipment (“DME”),
regardless of cost; all replacement equipment and repairs; and any DME
item over $100.168 The plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction to
impose specific deadlines for the defendant to respond to prior
authorization requests for DMEs.169 The court stated that Medicaid
programs must use reasonable promptness in acting on prior
authorization requests. It noted that when a state agency fails to
promulgate regulations that establish an express time to respond to prior
authorization requests, courts are “uniquely suited to determining what is
reasonable” under the Medicaid Act.170 The court then set a twenty-dayturnaround time for such determinations, noting that the DSS’ suggestion
of thirty days was unreasonable.171
Similarly, in Smith v. Miller, Medicaid providers filed a class action
suit against the director of the Illinois Department of Public Aid (“DPA”)
alleging that the DPA had not processed prior authorization requests for
specialized medical care promptly enough to satisfy the reasonable
promptness provision.172 The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief to
establish fixed time limits.173 In finding that the failure to promulgate
time limits and the resulting delays violated the reasonable promptness
provision, the court enjoined the DPA to process such requests within ten
to thirty days. If the DPA failed to meet the thirty-day deadline to respond
to a request, the court would deem the request automatically approved.174
The court noted that the “prompt action by the [S]tate is crucial in the
medical assistance program . . . because even retroactive payment may
not be fully remedial for the delays and ‘delay beyond the time limits may
. . . impose lingering, if not irreversible, hardships upon recipients.’”175
Therefore, if an insurer fails to set a time limit in which it must respond
or takes too long to respond to a prior authorization request, a Medicaid
enrollee may be able to bring a case for violation of the reasonable
promptness provision.

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.

Ladd v. Thomas, 141 F.Supp.2d 222, 223 (D. Conn. 1998).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Smith v. Miller, 665 F.2d 172, 177 (7th Cir. 1981).
Id.
Id.
Kessler v. Blum, 591 F. Supp. 1013, 1032 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (citing Smith, 665 F.2d at 177).
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3. The Medicare Act’s Part D Formulary Requirements
Under the Medicare Act, CMS has the authority to issue enforcement
actions against Medicare plan sponsors that impose overly restrictive
prior authorization policies on enrollees.176 Each year, CMS reviews
Medicare prescription drug plans and their proposed use of prior
authorization processes to adjudicate Medicare prescription drug claims
(“Part D claims”).177 While Medicare prescription drug plan sponsors
are permitted to use prior authorization, pharmacy and therapeutic
committees must develop and review such policies, and the sponsor must
establish an exception process.178
Failing to follow these requirements can result in civil money penalties
and termination of contracts.179 For example, in November 2015,
SilverScript Insurance Company failed to properly effectuate prior
authorization and exception requests and applied unapproved prior
authorization policies.180 As a result, enrollees experienced inappropriate
denials of coverage at the point of sale and were delayed access to drugs,
never received the drugs, or incurred increased out-of-pocket costs.181 In
response, CMS imposed a $594,100 penalty on the insurance
company.182
Additionally, Medicare enrollees must have uninterrupted access to all
or substantially all of the drugs in six drug classes that CMS has
specifically designated. Prescription drug plans are not permitted to
require prior authorization policies for enrollees stabilized on drugs from
these six protected classes, which include antidepressants, antipsychotics,
anticonvulsants for seizures, antiretroviral for treatment of HIV,
176. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27(c)(2) (2012) (incorporated into Medicare Part D by 42 U.S.C. §
1395w-112(b)(3)(B)); 42 C.F.R. § 423.509(a) (2008); Part C and Part D Enforcement Actions,
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-andAudits/Part-C-and-Part-D-Compliance-and-Audits/PartCandPartDEnforcementActions-.html (last
visited May 8, 2017) [hereinafter Part C and Part D Enforcement].
177. See 42 C.F.R. § 423.272(b)(2) (2015) (stating plan designs); CTRS. FOR MEDICARE &
MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL, CMS Pub.100-18, ch. 6,
§ 30.2 (rev. 18 Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-DrugCoverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf
(outlining the review and negotiation process of bids, and approval of plans submitted by potential
Part D sponsors).
178. 42 C.F.R. § 423.10(b)(x) (2015).
179. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-27I(2) (2010); Part C and Part D Enforcement, supra note 176.
180. Letter from Gerard J. Mulcahy, Dir., Medicare Parts C & D Oversight & Enf’t Grp., to
Todd
Meek,
President,
SilverScript
Ins.
Co.
(Nov,
20,
2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Compliance-and-Audits/Part-C-and-Part-D-Compliance-andAudits/Downloads/SilverScript_CMP_11_20_2015.pdf.
181. Id.
182. Id.
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antineoplastic for treatment of cancer, and immunosuppresses to prevent
the rejection of transplants.183
Enforcement actions can stem from an insurer’s failure to comply with
CMS’ guidelines regarding drug formularies. For example, in 2010,
CMS terminated its contract with Fox Insurance Company (“Fox”) for
imposing improper prior authorization protocols that resulted in
imminent and serious risk to the health of enrollees.184 CMS found that
Fox delayed and denied access to medically necessary drugs and
therapies in protected classes, including HIV, cancer, and anti-seizure
medications, and never obtained approval from CMS for the application
of prior authorization criteria for these drugs.185
Specifically, Fox inappropriately utilized “high-cost edits” (i.e., it
flagged drugs in its systems simply because the drugs were expensive or
exceeded a certain cost threshold). Health plans can appropriately use
high-cost edits to prevent inadvertent overbilling claims. Pharmacists
routinely resolve these edits at the pharmacy counter with no significant
delays. But Fox inappropriately utilized the edit when it notified the
pharmacist that prior authorization requirements—requirements not
approved by CMS—had not been met for formulary drugs. Fox’s actions
resulted in thousands of rejected claims. Inappropriate denials for highcost drugs forced enrollees to make a decision whether to pay for their
drugs out of pocket or forego the life-sustaining medication. Given the
low-income status of 90 percent of Fox’s enrollees, the option of paying
out of pocket proved too cost prohibitive and thus, many enrollees had to
leave pharmacies without their prescriptions.
As a result, CMS terminated Fox’s Medicare Part D services contract
and ordered Fox to immediately repay funds that the government paid to
Fox during the month in which the contract was terminated.186
Therefore, if a prescription drug plan uses prior authorization in an
unapproved manner, resulting in inappropriate denials, CMS can take an
enforcement action.
4. State Claim Based on Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Prior authorization policies may violate UDTP laws if determinations
183. 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-104(b)(3)(G)(i) (2012); 42 C.F.R. § 423.120(b)(2)(v) (2015); CTRS.
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICARE PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT MANUAL, CMS
Pub.100-18, ch. 6, § 30.2.5 (rev. 18 Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/PrescriptionDrug-Coverage/PrescriptionDrugCovContra/Downloads/Part-D-Benefits-Manual-Chapter-6.pdf.
184. Letter from Tranchida to Shankar, supra note 146.
185. Id.
186. Fox Ins. Co., Inc. v. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 715 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir.
2013).
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are made in a deceptive or misleading manner. An insurer may engage
in deceptive trade practices if its actual practices are contrary to those
represented to consumers in plan documents.187 For example, if the
insurer makes a medical necessity determination that is inconsistent with
the definition of medical necessity in its own policy, such a determination
may violate UTDP laws.188 Additionally, an insurer may also violate
UTDP laws if it refuses to pay a claim without conducting a reasonable
investigation of medical necessity or makes its decision based on cost
alone.189 As the American Civil Liberties Union has stated in relation to
a class action lawsuit against Indiana’s Medicaid program, “a medically
necessary treatment is a medically necessary treatment, no matter what
the cost.”190
In April 2016, New York’s attorney general sued Capital District
Physician’s Health Plan (“CDPHP”) for violating the State’s UDTP laws
for unlawfully restricting coverage of treatment for individuals with
hepatitis C.191 Similar to the WHCA in Teeter,192 CDPHP allegedly
denied coverage for the treatment unless an enrollee could prove
advanced liver damage, as diagnosed by a specialist rather than a primary
care provider. CDPHP also restricted coverage to individuals who could
prove that they had not used drugs or alcohol within the past six months.
Also, if the enrollee did not have liver scarring, the enrollee would have
to wait until he or she developed liver scarring before the treatment would
be covered.
The attorney general stated that “forcing patients to wait for care,
risking internal organ damage . . . violate[d] the law and the company’s
own policies.”193 The attorney general further argued that such practice
187. N.M. CODE R. § 13.10.17.7(L) (LexisNexis 2017); Rodarte v. Presbyterian Ins. Co., 371
P.3d 1067 (N.M. Ct. App. 2016).
188. Complaint at 17–19, New York v. Capital Dist. Physicians’ Health Plan, Inc., No. 450471
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 14, 2016).
189. Hunter v. Regence Blue Shield, No. 56638-5-I, 2006 WL 2396643, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App.
Aug. 21, 2016) (referring to WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 284-30-330 (2017)).
190. Michael Ollove, Are States Obligated to Provide Expensive Hepatitis C Drugs?, PEW
CHARITABLE
TR.,
(Feb.
9,
2016),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2016/02/09/are-states-obligated-to-provide-expensive-hepatitis-c-drugs.
191. Complaint at 2–3, Capital Dist. Physicians’ Health Plan, Inc., No. 450471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 14, 2016); Claire Hughes, AG Reaches Hepatitis C Agreement with 7 Insurers, but not
CDPHP, TIMESUNION (Apr. 26, 2016, 11:08 PM), http://www.timesunion.com/local/article/AGreaches-hepatitis-C-agreement-with-7-insurers-7377599.php.
192. B.E. & A.R. v. Teeter, No. C16-227-JCC, 2016 WL 3033500, at *1 (W.D. Wash. May 27,
2016).
193. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Lawsuit Accuses
Health Insurer CDPHP of Unlawfully Denying Coverage of Hepatitis C. Treatment (Apr. 14, 2016),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-lawsuit-accuses-health-insurer-cdphp-
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violated New York’s UDTP law because CDPHP failed to disclose the
role that cost plays in making medical necessity determinations. He
argued that the plan documents misled enrollees into believing that
medically necessary care would be covered when, in fact, CDPHP
refused to cover treatment for hepatitis C consistent with generally
accepted standards of care, prevailing medical guidelines, and the FDAapproved indications for the medications on the insurer’s formulary. 194
The complaint alleged that, rather than covering care for all enrollees for
whom treatment was medically necessary, it only covered treatment for
enrollees whose care was deemed most medically necessary.195 The
attorney general and CDPHP settled weeks later. CDPHP agreed to
change its policy and no longer restricted coverage of certain hepatitis C
treatments to individuals with the most severe symptoms.196 The insurer
also stopped denying coverage based on individuals’ drug or alcohol use,
and began to allow treatment authorization from any trained provider (not
just a liver specialist).197
5. State Common Law Claim for Insurance Bad Faith
An individual may be able to bring a common law claim for insurance
bad faith if an insurer implements an overly burdensome prior
authorization policy. The tort of insurance bad faith arises out of the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and applies when an
insurer denies or refuses to settle a claim within policy limits.198 To
recover under a common law claim of bad faith, the plaintiff must show
that the defendant did not have a reasonable basis for denying benefits
under the policy and that the defendant knew or recklessly disregarded its
lack of reasonable basis in denying the claim.199 For example, an
individual may be able to bring a claim for bad faith if the insurer denied
his or her claim by interpreting “medical necessity” in a manner that is
unlawfully-denying-coverage.
194. Complaint at 18, Capital Dist. Physicians’ Health Plan, Inc., No. 450471 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Apr. 14, 2016).
195. Id.
196. Hughes, supra note 191.
197. Id.
198. See, e.g., Anderson v. Cont’l Ins. Co, 271 N.W.2d 368, 378 (Wis. 1978) (discussing that
there only needs to be a showing of “knowledge or reckless disregard of the lack of a reasonable
basis for denying or refusing to honor or negotiate on an insured’s claim”); Crisci v. Sec. Ins. Co.,
426 P.2d 173, 176–77 (Cal. 1967) (demonstrating instances where courts held against the insurer
for breach of implied covenant of good faith).
199. E.g., Prod. Source Int’l, LLC v. Foremost Signature Ins. Co., 195 F.Supp.3d 660 (D.N.J.
2016); Terletsky v. Prudential Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 649 A.2d (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994) (explaining
the common law burden that the plaintiff must reach to be successful on a claim of bad faith).
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inconsistent with the standard of care, by denying coverage for a
treatment based on the insurer’s desire to decrease costs and increase
profits, or unduly delaying payment for treatment.200
The plaintiff may also have to prove that the insurer was motivated by
self-interest or ill will.201 An insurer cannot shield itself from bad-faith
liability by merely investigating a claim in a manner calculated to
construct a pretextual basis for denying a claim.202 As part of its common
law duty, an insurer has an obligation to conduct an adequate
investigation before denying a claim.203 Moreover, if the insurer’s
conduct is part of a pattern or practice of bad-faith behavior toward its
enrollees, a court may award punitive damages.204
Other states have codified bad faith causes of action, and therefore,
may not recognize common law actions for bad faith.205 For example,
under Colorado law, “a person engaged in the business of insurance shall
not unreasonably delay or deny payment of a claim for benefits owed to
or on behalf of any first-party claimant.”206 Likewise, Montana’s unfair
claim settlement practices statute provides that an insurer may not
conduct the following activities as part of its general business practice:
(1) misrepresent pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to
coverages; (2) fail to acknowledge and act reasonably promptly in
response to claim communications; (3) refuse to pay claims without
conducting a reasonable investigation; (4) fail to make good faith
attempts for prompt, fair, and equitable settlements of claims if liability

200. Complaint, Pieper v. UnitedHealth Grp. Inc., No. 0:16-cv-00687 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2016);
see, e.g., McEvoy by Finn v. Grp. Health Co-op. of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397 (Wis. 1997)
(explaining that, given health maintenance organization (“HMO”) subscribers’ inferior position for
enforcing their contractual health care rights, the application of the tort of bad faith is an additional
means of ensuring that HMOs do not give cost containment and utilization review such significant
weight so as to disregard the legitimate medical needs of subscribers).
201. Andrews v. Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co., No. 14-5147, 2016 WL 3690091, at *4 (D.N.J. July 12,
2016).
202. Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Ruttiger, 265 S.W.3d 651, 661 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008), rev’d, 381
S.W.3d 430 (Tex. 2012); United Servs. Auto Ass’n v. Croft, 175 S.W.3d 457, 469–70 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2005).
203. Ruttiger, 265 S.W.3d at 661.
204. E.g., Mock v. Mich. Millers Mut. Ins. Co., 554 Cal.App.4th 306 (2d Dist. 1992) (showing
that a court can award punitive damages if a pattern of bad faith toward an insurer’s enrollees is
proven).
205. See, e.g., Spencer v. Aetna Life & Cas., 611 P.2d 149, 151–52 (Kan. 1980); see generally
Rossman v. GFG Corp. of Mo., 596 S.W.2d 469 (Mo. Ct. App. 1980) (discussing different states’
approaches to bad faith causes of actions).
206. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1115 (2008); Wilson v. Humana Health Plan, Inc., No. 14-cv03259, 2015 WL 849210, at *5 (D. Colo. 2015). These laws are sometimes referred to as “prompt
payment” laws.
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is reasonably clear; or (5) force enrollees to institute litigation to obtain
reimbursement by offering substantially less than the amounts ultimately
recovered in actions brought by the enrollees.207
An insurer’s delay or denial is unreasonable “if the insurer delayed or
denied authorizing payment of a covered benefit without a reasonable
basis for that action.”208 In McEvoy v. Group Health Cooperative of Eau
Claire, a Health Maintenance Organization (“HMO”) refused to
authorize more than six weeks of inpatient treatment for a thirteen-yearold girl with anorexia despite recommendations from the girl’s physicians
that she needed to remain in treatment longer.209 Even though the girl
had not met her treatment goals, the HMO would only authorize a weekly
outpatient group therapy session, not an inpatient treatment. Though
plaintiffs typically bring a claim for bad faith against traditional insurers,
the court permitted the plaintiff in McEvoy to bring the claim against her
HMO.210 The court noted that the “application of the tort of bad faith is
an additional means of ensuring that HMOs do not give cost containment
and utilization review such significant weight so as to disregard the
legitimate medical needs of subscribers.”211 The court noted that the
HMO denied reimbursement without establishing a reasonable basis.
While the court stated that reasonably debatable claims were not subject
to bad faith claims, it refused to find that the HMO was not required to
pay for the plaintiff’s extended care simply because the contract required
the HMO’s prior authorization for the expenditure.212 It noted that
“[s]uch unilateral authority would give [the HMO] the sole power to
determine when and to what extent it would be bound to its subscriber
contracts.”213 The court, therefore, held that
[w]here an HMO authorizes a referral to an out-of-network provider,
the HMO may not end that referral against the recommendation of the
treating physicians solely on the basis of cost-containment concerns
when the subscriber has not reached the contractual coverage limits.
Thus, such an improper denial can constitute a bad faith denial.214

Therefore, enrollees may be able to bring a claim for bad faith for
burdensome or abusive prior authorization policies if such policies are
207.
208.
209.
1997).
210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-18-201 (2015).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1115 (2008); Wilson, 2015 WL 849210, at *5.
McEvoy by Finn v. Grp. Health Co-op of Eau Claire, 570 N.W.2d 397, 400–01 (Wis.
Id. at 405.
Id. at 403.
Id. at 404–05.
Id. at 404.
Id. at 404.

11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

1076

Loyola University Chicago Law Journal

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

[Vol. 48

misleading, result in undue delay in payment, are inconsistent with
standards of care, or are based on cost containment alone.
E. Network Adequacy
Network adequacy “refers to a health plan’s ability to deliver the
benefits promised by providing reasonable access to a sufficient number
of in-network primary care and specialty physicians, as well as all health
care services included under the terms of the contract.”215 For a network
to be considered adequate, it must offer access to adequate care, at the
appropriate time, and without requiring an unreasonable amount of
travel.216 By contrast, inadequate networks often result in individuals
forgoing treatment or paying large sums out of pocket to see more
conveniently located out-of-network providers.217 Overly “narrow
network” schemes designed to limit access to quality health care
providers are increasingly restricting access to quality health care.218 For
example, if a network has an insufficient number of in-network providers,
the plan enrollee may be forced to see an out-of-network provider.
Moreover, while the ACA limits out-of-pocket costs for the 2017 plan
year to $7,150 for individuals and $14,300 for families, these limits do
not apply to any services provided by an out-of-network provider.219
Therefore, if an individual were to obtain treatment from an out-ofnetwork provider at an in-network hospital, he or she may receive a
surprise medical bill—an occurrence that one in five individuals who visit
the emergency department have faced.220
1. Federal Claim Based on the ACA’s Network Adequacy Standards
The ACA established network adequacy standards for QHPs, which
gave lawmakers and policymakers a vehicle for ensuring standards are
met and consumer needs are addressed.221 ACA regulations require plans
to ensure that their networks include essential community providers and

215. Network Adequacy, NAT’L ASS’N INS. COMMISSIONERS (July 14, 2016),
http://www.naic.org/cipr_topics/topic_network_adequacy.htm.
216. 45 C.F.R. § 156.230 (2012).
217. Network Adequacy, supra note 215.
218. Id.
219. Matthew Rae et al., Patient Cost-Sharing in Marketplace Plans, 2016, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Nov. 13, 2015), http://kff.org/health-costs/issue-brief/patient-cost-sharing-inmarketplace-plans-2016/.
220. Dan Mangan, Many Get Hit with Surprise ‘Out-of-Network’ Bill After Emergency Rooms:
Study, CNBC (Nov. 16, 2016, 5:00 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/2016/11/16/many-get-hit-withsurprise-out-of-network-bill-after-emergency-rooms-study.html.
221. Network Adequacy, supra note 215.
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maintain sufficient numbers and types of providers.222 Insurers offering
QHPs must publish up-to-date, accurate, and complete provider
directories online.223 The general public must be able to view all current
providers for a plan in the provider directory on the plan issuer’s public
website through a clearly identifiable link or tab.224 If an insurer or selffunded nonfederal governmental group plan fails to meet the ACA’s
network adequacy requirements, an individual can file a complaint with
the State under the Public Health Services Act.225 Given the recent
enactment of the ACA and this requirement, no complaints appear to be
filed alleging ACA violations for narrow networks as of yet, but if an
insurer were to fail to meet the network adequacy requirements under the
ACA, filing a complaint is an option.
2. CMS’ Transparency Rule
Failure to provide accurate network directories may violate CMS rules.
As of 2016, CMS requires Medicare Advantage Organizations
(“MAOs”), public or private organizations that states license to provide
services to Medicare beneficiaries, to communicate at least every three
months with providers to ascertain their availability and whether they are
accepting new patients.226 CMS also expects MAOs to update their
online provider directories in real time and provide complete information
on all active contracted providers, including notations highlighting
providers who are closed or not accepting new patients.227 In a separate
rule, CMS requires insurers to provide online and to update monthly
222. Id. An “essential community provider” is a provider that serves predominantly lowincome, medically underserved individuals, including a health care provider; a state-owned family
planning service site; governmental family planning service site; or not-for-profit family planning
service site that does not receive federal funding under special programs.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. The Public Health Services Act contemplates the states as being the primary enforcers of
the ACA’s private health insurance market reforms. But if the Secretary of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services (“HHS”) determines that a state has failed to
substantially enforce a provision, including the ACA’s network adequacy requirements, HHS may
take enforcement action and impose civil penalties. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-22(a)(2), (b)(2) (2012);
Jennifer Staman, Enforcement of Private Health Insurance Market Reforms Under the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), CONG. RES. SERVS. 1, 5 (Feb. 7, 2011).
226. Brian Eastwood, CMS Tighten Provider Directory Rules for 2016, FIERCE HEALTHCARE
(Mar. 9, 2015, 12:01 PM), http://www.fiercehealthcare.com/payer/cms-tightens-providerdirectory-rules-for-2016.
227. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ADVANCE NOTICE OF METHODOLOGICAL
CHANGES FOR CALENDAR YEAR (CY) 2016 FOR MEDICARE ADVANTAGE (MA) CAPITATION
RATES, PART C AND PART D PAYMENT POLICIES AND 2016 CALL LETTER (Feb. 20, 2015),
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/HealthPlans/MedicareAdvtgSpecRateStats/Downloads/Advance2016.pdf.
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directories for QHPs sold in federally facilitated marketplaces.228 MAOs
providing inaccurate directories face a penalty fine of up to $25,000 per
day per enrollee or restrictions on new enrollment and marketing.229
Plans sold on the federal exchange face penalties of up to $100 a day per
affected enrollee for deficient directories.230 It appears that no
enforcement actions have been taken yet pursuant to violations of these
transparency rules.
3. State Claim Based on Network Adequacy Laws
Narrow networks may also violate state network adequacy laws. State
approaches to regulating network adequacy vary widely, due in part to a
state’s need to “maintain robust health insurance markets by balancing
access needs with the goals of controlling costs and attracting a healthy
number of insurers.”231 For example, in some states, network adequacy
rules may only apply to certain subsets of plans.232 Furthermore, while
some states do not use quantitative standards to measure adequacy, a
majority of states have at least one quantitative standard (e.g., standards
related to maximum travel time or distance, provider-to-enrollee ratios,
maximum appointment waiting times, and hours of operation).233 State
regulations also differ on whether regulators have the authority to conduct
ongoing oversite investigations.234
In California, network adequacy regulations require insurers offering
individual health or group disability insurance to ensure that “network
providers . . . are sufficient in number, capacity, and specialty to be
capable of furnishing the health care services covered by the insurance
contract, taking into account the number of covered persons, their

228. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., FINAL 2016 LETTER TO ISSUERS IN THE
FEDERALLY-FACILITATED
MARKETPLACES
(Feb.
20,
2015),
https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Regulations-andGuidance/Downloads/2016_Letter_to_Issuers_2_20_2015.pdf.
229. Susan Jaffe, Obamacare, Private Medicare Plans Must Keep Updated Doctor Directories
in 2016, KAISER HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 9, 2015), http://khn.org/news/health-exchange-medicareadvantage-plans-must-keep-updated-doctor-directories-in-2016/.
230. Id.
231. Sally McCarty & Max Farris, ACA Implications for State Network Adequacy Standards,
STATE HEALTH REFORM ASSISTANCE NETWORK, ROBERT WOOD JOHNSON FOUND. 1, 1 (Aug.
2013), http://www.rwjf.org/content/dam/farm/reports/issue_briefs/2013/rwjf407486.
232. Justin Giovannelli, Implementing the Affordable Care Act: State Regulation of
Marketplace Plan Provider Networks, COMMONWEALTH FUND (May 5, 2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/issue-briefs/2015/may/state-regulation-ofmarketplace-plan-provider-networks.
233. Id.
234. Id.
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characteristics and medical needs.”235
The regulations also incorporate quantitative adequacy measures.
These measures may include having a particular number of full-time
physicians, including primary care physicians, per enrollees; a sufficient
number of primary care providers, mental health professionals, and
network hospitals within thirty minutes of an enrollee’s residence or
workplace; and a sufficient number of specialists accepting new patients
within sixty minutes of an enrollee’s residence or workplace.236 Other
regulations include standards on hours of operation237 and several
quantitative and nonquantitative standards related to appointment waiting
times.238
The California Department of Insurance is responsible for oversight
and enforcement of the regulations cited above.239 Consumers may
reference their state’s network adequacy laws and regulations or consult
their state’s insurance department for more information. If a consumer
believes that an insurer is in violation of a network adequacy standard,
the consumer may file a complaint with his or her state’s insurance
department. But while network adequacy laws and regulations exist,
courts tend to favor the defendant.240
4. State Breach of Contract Claim
If a Medicare Advantage (“MA”) insurance provider terminates its
contract with health care providers midyear, such a bait-and-switch tactic
to narrow the network can result in a breach of contract claim. For
example, in Fairfield County Medical Association v. United Healthcare
of New England, two professional organizations sued United Healthcare
(“United”) on behalf of approximately 2,200 physicians that United
terminated “without cause” from its MA program.241 United sent the
physicians a letter notifying them that they would be removed from
United’s MA network in approximately three months.242 The insurer
characterized the change as an “amendment” to its contract with the
235. CAL CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2240.1(b)(1) (2017).
236. Id. § 2240.1(c).
237. Id. § 2240.15.
238. Id. § 2240.1(b)(4).
239. The 12921 California Department of Managed Health Care enforces separate network
adequacy laws related to HMOs and preferred provider organizations (“PPOs”).
240. E.g., Appalachian Reg’l Healthcare, Inc. v. Coventry Health & Life Ins. Co., 714 F.3d 424
(6th Cir. 2013); Capital Health Sys., Inc. v. N.J. Dep’t of Banking & Ins., 139 A.3d 134 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 2016).
241. 985 F.Supp.2d 262, 266 (D. Conn. 2013).
242. Id.
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physicians.243 The physicians argued that United’s actions constituted a
breach of contract and sought an injunction to prevent the unilateral
termination.244
The court held that United’s argument that it had a unilateral right to
terminate participating providers from the MA plan by an “amendment”
of that plan is not supported by the language of the contract or the parties’
experience under it.245 Furthermore, it held that the providers who were
subject to the termination notices would suffer irreparable harm due to
“(1) disruption of their relationships with their Medicare Advantage
patients, (2) loss of goodwill and reputational harm, and (3) a resulting
loss of ability to compete in the market for provision of Medicare
services.”246 The court found that even if the providers were to prevail
on their claim against the insurer, it was unlikely that the former patients
would return to the providers once they rejoined the network because
most patients would have found other providers in the meantime.247
Therefore, the court granted the providers a preliminary injunction
preventing United from removing the affected physicians from its MA
network based on their breach of contact claim.248
5. State Claim Pursuant to Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practice Laws
Narrow network schemes may violate state UDTP laws. For example,
California’s CLRA prohibits any person from committing certain “unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in a
transaction intended to result or which results in the sale or lease of goods
or services to any consumer.”249 The California statute instructs courts
to liberally construe and apply its underlying purpose (i.e., “to protect
consumers against unfair and deceptive business practices and to provide
efficient and economical procedures to secure such protection”).250
Prohibited practices include (1) representing that services have approval,
characteristics, uses, or benefits that they do not have;251 (2) advertising
services with the intent not to sell them as advertised; 252 (3) representing
that a transaction confers or involves certain rights, remedies, or
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
CAL. CIV. CODE § 1770(a) (West 2017).
Id. § 1760.
Id. § 1770(a)(5).
Id. § 1770(a)(9).
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obligations which it does not have;253 and (4) inserting an unconscionable
term in a contract.254
Similarly, the UCL is designed to protect consumers and business
competitors from unfair business practices. The UCL contains a general,
broad prohibition against unfair competition, which is defined as
including “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.”255
In July 2014, a California class of plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against Blue
Cross of California alleging that the insurer canceled all of its existing
non-ACA-compliant health plans and only made available new ACAcompliant plans.256 According to the complaint, Blue Cross marketed
and represented its new plans as having specific in-network physicians
and hospitals, and then reduced these networks during the open
enrollment period. Consumers did not discover that the networks did not
include the providers that Blue Cross represented as “in-network” until
after they were already enrolled in the new plans.
The plaintiffs and class members alleged that “Blue Cross’s bait-andswitch tactics of representing and advertising that its [health plans had]
certain providers in the plans’ networks when those providers [were] not
actually in the plans’ networks” violated the CLRA. 257 Specifically, they
alleged that Blue Cross (1) represented that the health plans had provider
network characteristics that they did not have; (2) advertised health plans
as having provider network characteristics with the intent not to sell them
as advertised; (3) represented that a transaction conferred certain provider
network rights, remedies, or obligations which they did not have; and (4)
adopted “unconscionable contract provisions requiring undisclosed
higher deductible limits for out-of-network providers, adopting
inadequate provider networks, and concealing material terms of the
coverage.”258
The complaint also contained allegations that Blue Cross violated the
UCL because Blue Cross’s actions were unlawful, unfair, and fraudulent
business practices.259 Although Blue Cross did not admit to any
wrongdoing, it settled the case, along with three other class action suits
against it, in March 2016.260 Blue Cross agreed to reimburse class
253. Id. § 1770(a)(14).
254. Id. § 1770(a)(19).
255. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 17200 (West 2017).
256. Complaint at 2, Felser v. Blue Cross of Cal., No. BC550739 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct.
July 8, 2014).
257. Id. at 5.
258. Id. at 3–4.
259. Id. at 5.
260. Amended Class Settlement Agreement and Release at 3, Felser, No. BC550739 (Cal. App.
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members for all of their out-of-pocket expenses for the period at issue,
with an estimated aggregate total of approximately $15 million.
F. Clinical Pathways Programs
Clinical pathways are “multidisciplinary care plans that provide
specific guidance on the sequencing of care steps and the timeline of
interventions” to influence practitioners’ treatment decisions.261 When
an independent panel with proper medical or scientific training creates
clinical pathways, they may be an appropriate tool to guide a physician’s
treatment decisions. But insurers use their own, internally developed
clinical pathways to steer providers toward their preferred sequence of
treatment by offering them a financial incentive or disincentive. 262 For
example, WellPoint offers oncologists monthly payments of $350 for
each patient treated in compliance with the insurer’s recommended
treatment pathways.263 A recent survey of managed care insurers showed
that 46 percent of network physicians are provided with financial
incentives to follow the pathways, 38 percent are encouraged but not
incentivized, and 23 percent are required to follow the pathways to
remain in the plan’s network.264
The growing use of financial incentives to encourage the promotion of
certain treatments over others is unethical and creates a conflict of
interest. Practicing physicians have a moral obligation to use sound,
professional judgment when making treatment decisions. Physicians
must recommend treatments that are best suited for their patients, and not
those that would provide them with greatest financial gain.
Clinical pathways also limit patient access to new and effective
treatments and technologies, discourage personalized care, are not
suitable for unusual or unpredicted conditions, and do not respond to
unexpected changes to an individual’s condition.265 Instead, clinical
pathways are designed to align treatment protocols with insurers’
Dep’t Super. Ct. Mar. 18, 2016).
261. AVALERE HEALTH LLC, CLINICAL PATHWAYS: OVERVIEW OF CURRENT PRACTICES AND
POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR PATIENTS, PAYERS, AND PROVIDERS 4 (2015).
262. Id. at 10. Hereinafter, please note that “clinical pathways” refers to insurer-driven clinical
pathways, and not those that are developed by medical and scientific experts, hereinafter. Id. at 6.
263. Anna Wilde Mathews, Insurers Push to Rein in Spending on Cancer Care, WALL STREET
J. (May 27, 2014, 3:51 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/insurer-to-reward-cancer-doctors-foradhering-to-regimens-1401220033.
264. Clinical Pathways: An Evolutionary Approach to Cancer Care, ONELIVE (June 14, 2013),
http://www.onclive.com/publications/oncology-business-news/2013/april-2013/clinicalpathways-an-evolutionary-approach-to-cancer-care/1.
265. Clinical Pathways: Multidisciplinary Plans of Best Clinical Practice, OPEN CLINICAL,
http://www.openclinical.org/clinicalpathways.html (last visited Apr. 17, 2017).

11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Now or Never

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1083

interests (i.e., cost reduction).266
1. State Medical Practice Acts
Clinical pathways may cause health care practitioners to violate state
medical practice acts. All fifty states have enacted medical practice acts,
which set out the structure and responsibilities of a state’s medical
board.267 State statutes and regulations define unethical conduct and
authorize a state’s medical board to receive complaints, perform
investigations, and discipline medical professionals for committing acts
prohibited by the statute.268 If deemed to be in violation of the law, some
states permit the state medical board to revoke a physician’s license to
practice medicine, place a physician on probation, or impose any other
sanctions authorized by the law.269
Nevada’s medical practice act (“Nevada Act”), for example, provides
at least four grounds by which a physician could be disciplined for
following an insurer’s incentive-based pathway. First, the Nevada Act
states that the medical board may initiate disciplinary action or deny a
license if a physician engages in conduct “that violates the trust of a
patient and exploits the relationship between the physician and the patient
for financial or other personal gain.”270 By accepting an incentive from
an insurer for administering care according to the insurer’s pathway, the
physician exploits the physician-patient relationship for financial gain
where the patient would be better served under an alternative treatment
regimen.
Second, physicians are subject to discipline when they receive from
“any person, corporation or other business organization any fee,
commission, rebate or other form of compensation which is intended or
tends to influence the physician’s objective evaluation or treatment of a
patient.”271 Under an incentive-based clinical pathway program, the
physician receives, and the insurer pays, a cash incentive for which the
insurer intends to influence the physician to care for a patient according
to the insurer’s cost-based pathway. Therefore, this program provides a
prohibited reward to influence a physician’s views and treatment
266. Roxanne Nelson, WellPoint Offers Oncologists Incentives to Follow Pathways,
MEDSCAPE MED (June 12, 2014), http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/826681.
267. FED’N OF STATE MED. BDS, U.S. MEDICAL REGULATORY TRENDS AND ACTIONS 6
(2016).
268. Id.
269. Investigations Division—Frequently Asked Questions, NEV. STATE BOARD MED.
EXAMINERS, http://medboard.nv.gov/Resources/FAQs/Investigations_Division/ (last visited Apr.
26, 2017).
270. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630.301(7) (2016).
271. Id. § 630.305(1)(a).
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decisions.
Third, the Nevada Act allows the medical board to discipline
physicians who fail to disclose to a patient any conflicts of interest.
Clinical pathway programs could create a conflict of interest when an
insurer provides an incentive to a physician as a way to influence the
physician’s patient-care decisions. Therefore, if physicians fail to notify
their patients of such conflict, they could be subjected to discipline.
Finally, the Nevada Act authorizes the state medical board to initiate
disciplinary proceedings where a physician “engages in conduct that
brings the medical profession into disrepute.”272 Given that clinical
pathway practices create conflicts of interest, they have the potential to
affect a physician’s objective medical judgment and violate patients’
trust. Therefore, a state medical board could potentially bring a
disciplinary action here if it could prove that these programs negatively
tainted the reputation of the medical profession.
2. State Commercial Bribery Statutes
Commercial bribery is generally understood as giving, or offering to
give, something of value with the intent to influence a relation between
commercial parties.273 Generally, laws prohibiting commercial bribery
are based upon agency principles regarding the impropriety of
influencing an agent to breach a duty it owes to a principal.274 But the
formulation of commercial bribery statutes varies from state to state,
differing in degrees of culpability, levels of intent or knowledge required,
and the relationship among the parties involved.275 Despite these
variations, many commercial bribery statutes are arguably broad enough
to encompass an insurer’s offer of incentives as a means of influencing a
physician to follow the insurer’s clinical pathway.
Connecticut’s law is representative of states with broad commercial
bribery statutes.276 In Connecticut, an offeror violates the statute where
he or she “confers, or agrees to confer, any benefit upon any employee,
agent or fiduciary without the consent of the latter’s employer or
principal, with intent to influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s
272. Id. § 630.301(9).
273. James G. Park, Extraterritorial Impact of United States Antitrust Laws and Commercial
Bribery Consideration, 1 DICKINSON INT’L L. ANN. 105, 119 (1982); Ryan J. Rohlfsen, Recent
Developments in Foreign and Domestic Criminal Commercial Bribery Laws, 2012 U. CHI. LEGAL
F. 151, 163.
274. Rohlfsen, supra note 273, at 151.
275. Id. at 163.
276. Illinois, New York, Kentucky, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Alabama also have laws
with similar language. Id. at 165, 172, 174, 185.
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or principal’s affairs.”277 An employee, agent, or fiduciary who receives
such a benefit violates the statute when, “without the consent of his
employer or principal, he solicits, accepts or agrees to accept any benefit
from another person upon an agreement or understanding that such
benefit will influence his conduct in relation to his employer’s or
principal’s affairs.”278
It is not uncommon for states to pursue claims against health care
professionals under commercial bribery laws. In June 2015, five doctors
were indicted in New Jersey for commercial bribery for referring patients
to a medical imaging center in exchange for cash and other kickbacks.279
Discussing the indictment, acting Attorney General Hoffman said, “[a]
doctor’s duty is to his patients’ care and well-being, not to his personal
wealth. By allegedly selling their medical opinion for kickbacks, the five
medical practitioners indicted today have abandoned that duty, thus
breaking the law and the trust of those who sought their advice.”280
An insurer offering incentives to a physician under a clinical pathway
arrangement is no different than the owner of a medical imaging center
who offers incentives for referrals. In both instances, an offer of cash is
made, without the patient’s consent, and with intent to influence the
physician’s conduct in relation to the patient’s affairs. Under the plain
language of a Connecticut’s commercial bribery statute, the insurer (i.e.,
the offeror of the benefit), would fall within the reach of the statute.
Pursuant to the New Jersey indictment, physicians participating in a
kickback scheme fall within the reach of state commercial bribery
statutes. But it is unclear whether a physician participating in a clinical
pathways arrangement violates a state commercial bribery statute. Under
such arrangement, the physician, as the patient’s fiduciary, 281 accepts a
cash incentive from the insurer without the patient’s consent. Therefore,
the clinical pathways arrangement violates the statute if a plaintiff can
show that the physician accepted the incentive knowing the benefit would
influence him or her to follow the insurer’s lower-cost treatment pathway.
277. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-160 (2015).
278. Id. § 53a-161.
279. Five Medical Practitioners Indicted for Taking Bribes in Exchange for Referring Patients
to Medical Imaging Centers Run by Criminal Enterprise, STATE N.J. DEP’T L. & PUB. SAFETY,
OFF. ATT’Y GEN. (June 3, 2015), http://nj.gov/oag/newsreleases15/pr20150603a.html.
280. Id.
281. Courts have long recognized that a physician is a fiduciary to his or her patients. See, e.g.,
Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (noting that a doctor-patient relationship
has “fiducial qualities”); United States v. Neufeld, 908 F. Supp. 491, 500 (S.D. Ohio 1995) (noting
that the “elements of a fiduciary relationship” exist in doctor-patient relationship); Stafford v.
Shultz, 270 P.2d 1, 7 (Cal. 1954) (finding a doctor-patient fiduciary relationship).
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A physician may argue in defense that he or she did not know the
benefit would influence his or her decision. But one study analyzing the
dynamics between physicians and prescription drug representatives
concluded that, even though physicians recognized the conflict of interest
and understood the concept in general, the relationship with the drug
representative created psychological dynamics that influenced
physicians’ reasoning.282 Another recent study revealed that payments
received from the medical industry affect doctors’ prescribing
practices.283 According to the study, on average, doctors who receive
payments from an interested party prescribe drugs differently than
doctors who do not accept payments.284 For example, the more money a
doctor receives, the more brand-name medications he or she tends to
prescribe.285 The same principles apply when the insurer offers
incentives to the provider. Therefore, a physician may be indicted under
a state commercial bribery statute for accepting incentives to follow an
insurer’s clinical pathway.
3. State Ethics
Clinical pathways may also violate ethical standards for which many
prescribers take an oath to uphold. For example, the American Medical
Association (“AMA”) first adopted its code of medical ethics (“Code”)
in 1847 in an effort to establish uniform standards for professional
education, training, and conduct.286 Nearly 170 years later, the everevolving Code is still the authoritative ethics guide for practicing
physicians, reflecting the profession’s core values and how they apply in
day-to-day practice.287 The Code covers a wide range of topics,
including the physician-patient relationship, conflicts of interest, and
gifts from members of the health care industry.
While the AMA is a voluntary organization, and therefore, prescribers
are not legally required to comply with the Code,288 a violation of the
282. Susan Chimonas et al., Physicians and Drug Representatives: Exploring the Dynamics of
the Relationship, 22 J. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 184, 189 (2007).
283. Charles Ornstein et al., Drug-Company Payments Mirror Doctors’ Brand-Name
Prescribing, NPR (Mar. 17, 2016, 5:00 AM), http://www.npr.org/sections/healthshots/2016/03/17/470679452/drug-company-payments-mirror-doctors-brand-name-prescribing.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. AMA History, AM. MED. ASS’N, https://www.ama-assn.org/ama-history (last visited Apr.
17, 2016).
287. Id.
288. AM. MED. ASS’N, Preamble, Principles of Medical Ethics, in ASS’N, AMA CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS 1, https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/principles-ofmedical-ethics.pdf (last updated June 2001).
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Code can have significant consequences at the state level. For example,
Kentucky’s medical practice act incorporates the Code by reference and
provides that the State’s board of medical licensure may deny an
application or reregistration for a medical license; place a licensee on
probation; suspend a license; limit or restrict a license for an indefinite
period; or revoke any license issued by the board, upon proof that the
licensee has “[e]ngaged in dishonorable, unethical, or unprofessional
conduct of a character likely to deceive, defraud, or harm the public or
any member thereof.”289 “Unethical conduct” includes a failure to
conform to the principles of medical ethics of the AMA.290 Therefore, a
violation of the Code may have serious disciplinary repercussions at the
state level, including losing the license to practice medicine.
The Code describes the physician-patient relationship as one based on
trust, “giving rise to the physicians’ ethical obligations to place patients’
welfare above their own self-interest and above obligations to other
groups, and to advocate for their patients’ welfare.” 291 This basic tenet
is the foundation for several sections of the Code dedicated to conflicts
of interest, which require physicians to avoid such conflicts and to resolve
any conflicts that may arise to the patient’s benefit.292 Furthermore, a
physician must avoid conflicts of interest to satisfy the guidelines related
to a patient’s right to informed consent, whereby the physician “has an
ethical obligation to help the patient make choices from among the
therapeutic alternatives consistent with good medical practice.”293
The Code’s guidelines on gifts from pharmaceutical, biotechnology,
and medical device companies adequately illustrate these principles. Due
to concerns that these gifts can create conditions that may bias, or be
perceived to bias, a physician’s professional judgement in caring for
patients, the Code states that, to “preserve the trust that is fundamental to
the physician-patient relationship and public confidence in the
profession, physicians should . . . decline cash gifts in any amount from

289. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.595(9) (2017).
290. Id. § 311.597.
291. AM. MED. ASS’N, The Physician-Patient Relationship, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL
ETHICS 1.1.1 (2016), https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-ofmedical-ethics-chapter-1.pdf.
292. AM. MED. ASS’N, Opinions on Financing & Delivery of Health Care, in AMA CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINIONS ON FINANCING & DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE 5 (2016),
https://www.ama-assn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter2.pdf.
293. AM. MED. ASS’N, Informed Consent, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS: OPINIONS ON
CONSENT, COMMUNICATION & DECISION MAKING 2 (2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-2.pdf.
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an entity that has a direct interest in physicians’ treatment
recommendations.”294
While the Code does not have specific guidelines on incentives from
insurance companies, incentive-based clinical pathways similarly create
a conflict of interest that may directly violate the Code’s guidelines on
the physician-patient relationship and avoiding conflicts of interest. By
giving physicians incentives to follow the insurer’s pathway, the
physician is forced to decide between the insurer’s cost-saving pathway
and a treatment plan that may be better suited for a specific patient’s
health care needs. If the physician follows the insurer’s pathway instead
of choosing a treatment most suitable for the patient’s individual needs,
then the physician may violate the Code by failing to resolve the conflict
in favor of the patient. Therefore, to avoid conflicts of interest and
preserve the trust that is fundamental to the physician-patient
relationship, physicians should decline cash incentives from insurers just
as they should decline cash gifts from other participants in the health care
industry.
III. RECOMMENDATIONS
Health care must be patient centered. Physicians need the autonomy
to independently consider a patient’s unique circumstances, recommend
a course of treatment that is most appropriate for the patient, and have
confidence that the patient will receive that prescribed medication.
Consumers must be empowered to bring lawsuits or file complaints so
that they not only obtain remedies for any sustained wrongdoing derived
from the lack of treatment access, but also to serve as a powerful deterrent
for bad actors in the insurance industry.
Additionally, where piecemeal lawsuits and investigations prove to be
an insufficient deterrent to systematically prevent insurers from blocking
access to care, lawmakers must take action to limit each of the specific
insurance practices that interfere with the physician-patient relationship.
While some states have already passed consumer-protection legislation
addressing some of the unfair business practices discussed above, many
states have yet to do so. These laws must contain key provisions with
strong language to ensure their effectiveness. Furthermore, current and
future laws need to be enforced and, in some cases, state lawmakers need
to increase the enforcement authority of their state’s insurance
commissioners and attorneys general.
294. AM. MED. ASS’N, Gifts to Physicians from Industry, in AMA CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS:
OPINIONS ON FINANCING & DELIVERY OF HEALTH CARE 9 (2016), https://www.amaassn.org/sites/default/files/media-browser/code-of-medical-ethics-chapter-9.pdf.
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A. Empowering Consumers to Take Action
In addition to strong enforcement by state and federal regulators,
educating, empowering, and encouraging consumers to take action would
help create disincentives for insurers to continue to implement unfair and
discriminatory policies. If an insurer uses a benefit utilization
management policy in a discriminatory manner, enrollees have several
options at their disposal that they can use to protect and enforce their
rights.
The first step is to appeal an adverse benefit determination. The ACA
requires insurers to strictly follow specific rules prior to rendering
adverse benefit determinations.295 For instance, the insurer must ensure
that all claims and appeals are adjudicated in a manner designed to ensure
the independence and impartiality of the persons involved in making the
decision.296 The insurer may not reduce or terminate an ongoing course
of treatment without providing advance notice and an opportunity for
advance review.297 As such, if coverage has been denied, the enrollee
should request a copy of the denial letter explaining the reason for any
denial of reimbursement or payment and disclosure of the criteria for
medical necessity determinations. He or she should then file an internal
appeal in which his insurance company conducts its own full and fair
review of its decision.298 It is important to note that the ACA and its
interim final regulations require an insurer to provide continued coverage
pending the outcome of an internal appeal.299
If the internal appeal is unsuccessful, the enrollee may then request an
external review in which an independent third party reviews the
decision.300 It may be necessary to seek the assistance of a patient
advocacy group or a state’s consumer assistance program with the appeal
process, some of which provide services free of charge. If the external

295. Complaint at 38–39, N.Y. State Psychiatric Ass’n, Inc. v. UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F.
Supp. 2d 527 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (No. 13 CV 1599).
296. Id. at 72 (citing Interim Final Rules for Group Health Plans and Health Issuers Relating to
Internal Claims and Appeals and External Review Processes Under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, 75 Fed. Reg. 43,330, 43,333 (July 23, 2010)).
297. Complaint at 283, UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d 527.
298. All plans must implement an effective internal appeals process of coverage determinations
and claims and comply with any applicable state external review process. 26 C.F.R. § 2590.7152719 (2016); see also How Do I Appeal a Health Plan Decision?, HEALTHCARE.GOV,
https://www.healthcare.gov/how-do-i-appeal-a-health-insurance-companys-decision/ (last visited
Apr. 17, 2016) (guidance on appealing health care determinations).
299. 26 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2719 (2015); Complaint at 83, UnitedHealth Grp., 980 F. Supp. 2d
527.
300. How Do I Appeal a Health Plan Decision?, supra note 298.
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reviewer overturns the insurer’s denial, the insurer must give the enrollee
payments or services requested in the enrollee’s claim.301
If an appeal is unsuccessful, the enrollee can then either file a lawsuit
or a complaint. Individuals with employee benefit plans302 should bring
suits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) to
challenge a denial of benefits that violates the ACA.303 ERISA governs
almost all health benefits plans offered through private employers, and
ERISA preempts state law.304 Under ERISA, plan participants and
beneficiaries can bring a case “to recover benefits due to [them] under the
terms of [their plans], to enforce [their] rights under the terms of the
plan[s], or to clarify [their] rights to future benefits under the terms of the
plan[s].”305 By bringing a claim to enforce employee benefit rights, the
enrollee can challenge a wide range of noncompliant plan design features
that can be addressed prospectively, without awaiting denial of a health
service.306
For private plans that ERISA may not govern, the enrollee may be able
to bring a lawsuit for state causes of action (e.g., violations of unfair trade
practice laws) after exhausting the plan’s appeals process. For systematic
denials, plaintiffs can ban together and file a class action.307
Alternatively, parties can file complaints with their state insurance
commissioner or attorney general, depending on the authority granted to
each party under state laws and regulations.
Medicaid recipients may also need to first exhaust the Medicaid plan’s
appeals process.308 A recipient may request to continue to receive
301. Appealing Health Plan Decisions, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS.,
http://www.hhs.gov/healthcare/rights/appeal/appealing-health-plan-decisions.html (last visited
Apr. 7, 2017).
302. ERISA employee benefit plans include all private sector employee benefit plans except for
church plans; plans in which the sole purpose is to comply with workers’ compensation,
unemployment, or disability insurance laws; plans maintained outside of the United States
primarily for the benefit of non-United States residents; or excess benefit plans. Additionally,
ERISA does not cover governmental plans. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a)-(b) (2015).
303. Id. § 1132(a); see Daniel F. v. Blue Shield of Cal., 305 F.R.D. 115, 130–31 (N.D. Cal.
2011) (providing an example of a plaintiff bringing a claim pursuant to section 502 of the ERISA
for federal parity violations).
304. THE CAL. PATIENT’S GUIDE, YOUR RIGHTS TO APPEAL AND LITIGATE BENEFIT DENIALS
UNDER ERISA 50 (2002).
305. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) (2015); Ellen Weber, Equity Standards for Health Insurance
Coverage: Will the Mental Health Parity and Addiction Equity Act End the Discrimination?, 43
GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 179, 225 (2013).
306. Weber, supra note 305, at 225.
307. See NB ex rel. Peacock v. D.C., 682 F.3d 77, 80 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (discussing a class
action medical denial suit).
308. Many states have an exhaustion requirement before a Medicaid recipient may request a
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coverage during the appeals process, but may be required to repay the
cost of such services if an adverse determination is given.309 If the appeal
has been unsuccessful, the participant has a right to a fair hearing through
the state regardless of whether the recipient obtains benefits through a
fee-for-service system or a managed care organization.310 The state
Medicaid agency must provide the recipient with written notice of appeal
rights when it denies coverage. The State will try the case de novo.311 If
the State overturns the Medicaid administrator’s decision, the agency
must promptly make corrective payments, retroactive to the date that the
incorrect action was taken, and, if appropriate, provide for admission or
readmission of an individual to a facility.312
B. Passing State Consumer Protection Legislation
Legislation, when thoughtfully drafted, is an effective way to mitigate
unfair, burdensome, and discriminatory insurance practices. This Part
discusses examples of recent consumer protection legislation aimed at
these practices, while highlighting key provisions of effective bills.
1. Step Therapy
As of July 2016, at least fifteen states enacted legislation to address
step therapy policies.313 An effective step therapy bill should include
provisions such as a clinical review criteria requirement;314 a step therapy
override determination process, which would allow an enrollee or
provider to request that a step therapy protocol not apply in certain
situations; time limits for insurers to respond to override requests; and a
requirement that enrollees do not have complete any particular step more
than once.
Lawmakers in Ohio introduced an effective step therapy bill in

state fair hearing. Navigating Medicare and Medicaid: Medicaid—Online Version, KAISER FAM.
FOUND. (Feb. 11, 2005), http://kff.org/other/navigating-medicare-and-medicaid-medicaid-onlineversion/.
309. KY. PROT. & ADVOCACY, MEDICAID DENIED MY REQUEST FOR SERVICES, NOW WHAT?
15 (2010).
310. 42 C.F.R. § 431.205 (2016); 42 C.F.R. § 431.220 (2016).
311. 42 C.F.R. § 431.244 (2016).
312. Id. § 431.246.
313. Step Therapy, COALITION ST. RHEUMATOLOGY ORGS., http://www.csro.info/failfirst (last
visited May 8, 2017).
314. “Clinical review criteria” means “written screening procedures, decision abstracts, clinical
protocols, and clinical practice guidelines used by a health plan issuer or utilization review
organization to determine the medical necessity and appropriateness of health care services.” S.B.
243, 131st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016).
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2015.315 The bill requires every insurer or utilization review organization
implementing a step therapy protocol to use clinical review criteria. An
independent panel of experts must develop the clinical review criteria
based on high-quality research and create a transparent process to ensure
that all steps are evidence based and consistent with medical standards of
care.316 Furthermore, the bill provides for a step therapy exemption
determination, which allows a provider to override an insurer’s step
therapy protocols if the provider finds that:
 The medication is contraindicated, would likely cause an adverse
reaction, or would likely result in harm to the enrollee;
 the medication is likely to be ineffective for the enrollee;
 the enrollee has already tried the requested medication under the
current or previous insurance plan and it was ineffective;
 the medication required by the insurer is not in the best interest
of the enrollee or medically appropriate; or
 the enrollee is stable on a particular medication currently selected
by the health care provider.317
Strong step therapy legislation, such as the Ohio bill, can help protect
consumers, prevent loopholes, and ensure that all step therapy decisions
are rooted in science and medicine.
2. Adverse Tiering
Several states have also introduced legislation aimed at limiting
specialty tiers. Both Oregon and Illinois have introduced bills with
effective provisions. For example, Oregon introduced a bill in 2015 that
prohibits insurers from placing all drugs within a therapeutic or
pharmacological class in the cost tier with the highest out-of-pocket
costs.318 Similarly, in 2015, Illinois introduced legislation that allows
enrollees to request an exception to the tiered cost-sharing structure so
that an insurer would have to cover nonpreferred medications under the
same cost-sharing structure as preferred drugs.319 An enrollee could
request the exception if the enrollee’s prescriber determines that the
preferred drug for treatment of the same condition would either be
ineffective for the individual, result in an adverse effect, or both.320
Strong legislation in this area should also include the following
provisions:
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

S.B. 243, 131st Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2015–2016).
Id.
Id.
H.B. 2951, 78th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015).
H.B. 3605, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015–2016).
Id.
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A requirement that copayments and coinsurance apply to a single
deductible that includes both prescription medications and health
care services;
 a requirement that placement of prescription medications on a
specific tier is based on clinical review criteria developed through
a transparent process by an independent commission of experts
to provide access; and
 a streamlined review and appeals process for adverse prior
authorization determinations, providing an expedited process for
urgent care services.
Some state legislation also includes caps on prescription copayments
or coinsurance.321 These caps range from $100 per month to $3,500 per
year.322 This type of protection need not be reserved to lawmakers; other
state agencies could ensure caps as well. For example, in 2015, the board
of California’s health insurance exchange agreed to impose a cap on cost
sharing for high-priced specialty drugs on state-run exchange plans.323
The cap for most enrollees on California’s exchange is now set at $250
per prescription per month.324 Under the prior system, enrollees had to
pay costs up to their plan deductible, which could amount to thousands
of dollars per month. Strong legislation and rules for state exchanges that
address specialty tiers provide enrollees with better access to care. These
rules also prevent and restrict insurers from limiting access on the basis
of a medical condition or disability.
3. Nonmedical Switching
Effective state legislation can curb nonmedical switching and allow
stable enrollees with chronic or rare conditions to maintain their current,
effective medication regimens. For example, in 2016, Florida lawmakers
introduced a bill that prohibits pharmacy benefit managers, individual
321. Sabrina Corlette et al., State Efforts to Reduce Consumers’ Cost-Sharing for Prescription
Drugs,
COMMONWEALTH
FUND
(Nov.
16,
2015),
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/blog/2015/nov/state-efforts-to-reduceconsumers-cost-sharing-for-prescription-drugs.
322. Michael Ollove, States Limiting Patient Costs for High-Priced Drugs, PEW CHARITABLE
TR.
(July
2,
2015),
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-andanalysis/blogs/stateline/2015/07/02/states-limiting-patient-costs-for-high-priced-drugs.
323. Peter Sullivan, Calif. ObamaCare Exchange Caps Patient Drug Costs, HILL (May 22,
2015, 1:13 PM), http://thehill.com/policy/healthcare/242951-calif-obamacare-exchange-capspatient-drug-costs.
324. Chad Terhune, Obamacare: California Exchange Caps Specialty Drug Costs for Patients,
L.A. TIMES (May 22, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://www.latimes.com/business/healthcare/la-fiobamacare-specialty-drug-costs-20150522-story.html. Bronze-level plans have a monthly cap of
$500, after a $500 pharmacy deductible is met. Id.
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and group insurers, and HMOs from limiting or excluding coverage for a
drug for individuals with complex, chronic, or rare conditions if (1) the
drug was previously approved for coverage by the insurer; (2) the
prescriber continued to prescribe the drug; and (3) the drug is
appropriately prescribed and is considered safe and effective for treating
a medical condition.325 The bill also prohibits insurers from placing
limitations on the maximum coverage of prescription drug benefits,
increasing out-of-pocket costs for the drug, and moving the drug to a
higher tier after the plan year has begun.326
Strong legislation should also require insurers to provide adequate and
advance notice to an enrollee if the insurer decides, during the annual
renewal period, to no longer cover a prescription medication or move it
to a different formulary tier. To protect enrollees from year to year,
effective legislation should also include a provision that requires the
insurer to continue such coverage for grandfathered plans.
A
comprehensive nonmedical switching bill that incorporates these
provisions, as well as the provisions discussed above, can ensure
uninterrupted, continuous care for enrollees who are stable on their
medications.
4. Prior Authorizations
To ensure that prior authorization policies are consistent with
evidence-based standards of care and do not result in undue delays or
denials of care, several states have introduced bills that govern the prior
authorization process.327 For example, West Virginia introduced a bill in
2016 that requires insurers to accept universal prior authorization forms,
permit electronic submission of prior authorization forms, respond to
authorization requests within certain deadlines, and recognize approved
requests as valid for no less than one year.328
Strong legislation should also standardize prior authorization
requirements and criteria across all plans by seeking to create a uniform
prior authorization form, urging the creation of an electronic submission
process, and requiring insurers to meet deadlines when responding to a
request to cut down on wait times. It should also include a requirement
that prior authorization be valid for the entirety of the enrollee’s
325. S.B. 1142, 2016–2017 Leg., Reg. Sess. 89 (Fla. 2016).
326. Id.
327. See, e.g., S.B. 273, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016) (imposing deadlines and requiring
universal authorization forms); H.B. 1608, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.H. 2016) (amending
prescription drug authorization procedures); H.B. 3605, 99th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2015–
2016) (requiring insurers to state reasons for denying coverage).
328. S.B. 273, 2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2016).

11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX11_WORTHY (1041-97).DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2017]

Now or Never

6/2/2017 11:10 AM

1095

eligibility period, inclusive of any renewal period (i.e., grandfathered
plans); a presumption of approval for coverage of a limited supply of
medication in certain defined cases where a delay in approval would
jeopardize an enrollee’s health; defined response deadlines, including
expedited response times for urgent care services; and a streamlined
appeals process for adverse prior authorization determinations. By
preventing insurers from implementing overly burdensome prior
authorization policies, these laws can help reduce undue delays of quality
care.
5. Network Adequacy
States have also enacted network adequacy laws or introduced
legislation to protect from surprise medical bills and ensure that
individuals have access to providers.329 For example, Kentucky law
requires managed care plans to “arrange for a sufficient number and type
of primary care providers and specialists throughout the plan’s service
area to meet the needs of enrollees.”330 The law includes many of the
key components of a strong network adequacy bill including
requirements that: a network contain a sufficient number of providers,
providers be accessible in each geographic location, information be
accurate and easily accessible, and a system be in place to report
inaccurate information and ensure such inaccuracies are corrected within
a reasonable timeframe. These provisions are intended to provide all
enrollees, regardless of geographic location, with accessible care without
unreasonable burden or delay.
6. Clinical Pathways
Some states have introduced legislation designed to prevent insurers
from providing improper incentives to health care providers. For
example, Nevada introduced legislation in 2015 that would require
insurers to disclose to all enrollees any incentive offered to a health care
provider to encourage the prescribing of certain medications, as well as
any compensation program designed to encourage a provider to withhold
treatment.331
In May 2016, California introduced a bill aimed specifically at clinical
pathways to “ensure transparency and accountability when health plans
329. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-515 (2016) (imposing requirements for
managed care in Kentucky); 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. 20/13.20(b) (2016) (imposing requirements for
managed care in Illinois).
330. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.17A-515 (2016).
331. S.B. 219, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Nev. 2015).
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develop and implement clinical care pathways.”332 The bill required
plans to ensure that clinical pathways are developed in accordance with
specified procedures, and it prohibited plans from developing and
implementing pathways that discouraged patient access to clinical
trials.333 While the bill is a step in the right direction, strong legislation
should also improve transparency and prohibit improper incentive
systems, such as the bill introduced in Nevada.
Many states—including California, Minnesota, Massachusetts, and
Vermont—prohibit or limit gifts from pharmaceutical or medical device
manufacturing companies to health care providers.334 For example,
Minnesota prohibits “any manufacturer or wholesale drug distributor, or
any agent thereof, to offer or give any gift of value to a practitioner.”335
States should consider amending these laws by extending their reach to
apply to insurers as well.
C. Strong Enforcement of Consumer Protection Laws
Insurers must be held accountable for unfair, deceptive, and
discriminatory practices. Proper enforcement of current laws and new
regulations can serve as a meaningful incentive for insurers to create
policies that are fair and transparent, thereby improving access to quality
health care for enrollees. Strong oversight and enforcement measures by
regulators of current consumer-protection laws can effectively achieve
this goal. Additionally, states with diluted consumer protection laws or
UDPT laws must enact stronger laws that protect its consumers against
predatory and unscrupulous business practices.
The effectiveness of consumer protection laws and regulations,
including the new legislation dealing with specific benefit utilization
management policies discussed in the previous Part, vary widely from
state to state.336 Many states have placed legal obstacles in the path of
officials charged with the enforcement of these consumer protection laws,
or imposed ceilings as low as $1,000 on civil penalties, effectively
making consumer protection laws meaningless because they cannot be
properly enforced.337 For example, states such as Alabama, Delaware,
Florida, and New Hampshire exempt insurers completely from the state
332. A.B. 2209, 2015–2016 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016).
333. Id.
334. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 119400, 119402 (West 2017); MINN. STAT. § 151.461
(2016); 105 MASS. CODE REGS. §§ 970.000–970.011 (2013); 18 VT. STAT. ANN., § 4631a (2015).
335. MINN. STAT. § 151.461 (2016).
336. Id.
337. Id.
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consumer protection laws; and other states such as Colorado, Indiana,
Nevada, North Dakota, and Wyoming impede the attorney general’s
ability to stop ongoing unfair or deceptive practices by conditioning relief
upon proof that unfair or deceptive practices were done knowingly or
intentionally.338
While states face the challenge of managing tight budgets and
allocating limited resources, they should recognize the importance of
consumer protection in this area and empower insurance commissioners
and attorneys general to aggressively monitor claims of unfair, deceptive,
and discriminatory practices. Aggressive monitoring alone is not enough,
however. Regulators must take a strong response to well-founded claims
against insurers, beginning with the completion of a thorough
investigation, and following up by pursuing equitable, monetary, and, if
appropriate, criminal penalties against insurers who violate state or
federal laws and regulations substantial enough to serve as a deterrent for
wrongdoing.
Additionally, states with weak consumer protection laws must amend
their statutes so that insurance companies must abide by the same
consumer protection laws as other businesses and are not given special
immunity, and attorneys’ general are not impeded from enforcing
consumer protection laws currently in place.
CONCLUSION
The use of unfair, burdensome, and discriminatory utilization
management practices continues to grow in the United States. These
practices put Americans at risk of receiving inferior treatments and
paying prohibitively higher costs. For those who cannot afford the added
expense, they have no choice but to forgo treatment or ration their care.
These practices are in direct violation of many federal and state laws that
were passed to protect access to treatment. Consumers, regardless of
their health condition, deserve access to timely and quality treatment, as
determined by their providers.
Therefore, consumers must be
empowered to sue under current laws, policymakers must pass stronger
consumer protection laws, and regulators must enforce existing
protections once they are provided with adequate authority to do so.

338. ALA. CODE § 8-19-7(3) (2017); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2513(b) (2017); FLA. STAT. §
501.212(4) (2016); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 358-A:3(I) (2017); CARTER, supra note 93, at 3.

